Discussion:
Causal determinism and non-materialist atheism
(too old to reply)
MarkE
2024-12-30 11:56:48 UTC
Permalink
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.

If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).

Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
is old ground for you):

"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."

The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
himself as an agnostic/atheist, and offers this response:

"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."

However (and I find this fairly reasonable):

"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."

Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
with reference to Plato's forms and mathematical abstractions:

"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."

"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"

(Don't be put off by the title)
Kerr-Mudd, John
2024-12-30 14:49:46 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 30 Dec 2024 22:56:48 +1100
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
"If I say it 3 times, then it's true"?
[snipped]
Post by MarkE
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Philosophy;: see DNA -
"what we demand is facts"
"no no, what we demand is rigidly defined areas of uncertainty!"
(from HHGTTG, might not be remembered correctly)
--
Bah, and indeed, Humbug
erik simpson
2024-12-30 16:36:55 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kerr-Mudd, John
On Mon, 30 Dec 2024 22:56:48 +1100
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
"If I say it 3 times, then it's true"?
[snipped]
Post by MarkE
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Philosophy;: see DNA -
"what we demand is facts"
"no no, what we demand is rigidly defined areas of uncertainty!"
(from HHGTTG, might not be remembered correctly)
C.S. Lewis doesn't express himself very clearly. I've read little of
what he's written, but he seems to me to be chasing his tail.
RonO
2024-12-30 20:08:49 UTC
Permalink
Post by Kerr-Mudd, John
On Mon, 30 Dec 2024 22:56:48 +1100
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
"If I say it 3 times, then it's true"?
[snipped]
Post by MarkE
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Philosophy;: see DNA -
"what we demand is facts"
"no no, what we demand is rigidly defined areas of uncertainty!"
(from HHGTTG, might not be remembered correctly)
C.S. Lewis doesn't express himself very clearly.  I've read little of
what he's written, but he seems to me to be chasing his tail.
His notions in this regard have never amounted to anything substantive.
What needs to be demonstrated is that they ever will amount to anything
worth discussing further. By this time you need to expect something
useful to have come out of his arguments. Why bring up a subject that
everyone else has failed to do anything with for over half a century?
What is the excuse for no one being able to establish some level of
validity to the arguments? It isn't because no one has tried.

This isn't like the ID scam where the reason that no ID science has ever
been attempted is because the Biblical creationists at the ID scam unit
have always expected to fail in accomplishing any valid ID science, and
they definitely never wanted to succeed. Kalk and Bill should tell us
if they ever wanted the ID perps to succeed in demonstrating designer
did it design for the Top Six best god-of-the-gaps claims of the ID
perps. The god that fills those gaps is not the god described in the Bible.

Ron Okimoto
MarkE
2024-12-30 22:51:15 UTC
Permalink
Post by RonO
Post by Kerr-Mudd, John
On Mon, 30 Dec 2024 22:56:48 +1100
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
"If I say it 3 times, then it's true"?
[snipped]
Post by MarkE
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Philosophy;: see DNA -
"what we demand is facts"
"no no, what we demand is rigidly defined areas of uncertainty!"
(from HHGTTG, might not be remembered correctly)
C.S. Lewis doesn't express himself very clearly.  I've read little of
what he's written, but he seems to me to be chasing his tail.
His notions in this regard have never amounted to anything substantive.
What needs to be demonstrated is that they ever will amount to anything
worth discussing further.  By this time you need to expect something
useful to have come out of his arguments.  Why bring up a subject that
everyone else has failed to do anything with for over half a century?
What is the excuse for no one being able to establish some level of
validity to the arguments?  It isn't because no one has tried.
I bring it up because I think it is a legitimate argument. The counter
argument (e.g. Fodor) seems to partially address this, but not
definitively IMO.
Post by RonO
This isn't like the ID scam where the reason that no ID science has ever
been attempted is because the Biblical creationists at the ID scam unit
have always expected to fail in accomplishing any valid ID science, and
they definitely never wanted to succeed.  Kalk and Bill should tell us
if they ever wanted the ID perps to succeed in demonstrating designer
did it design for the Top Six best god-of-the-gaps claims of the ID
perps.  The god that fills those gaps is not the god described in the
Bible.
Ron Okimoto
RonO
2024-12-31 01:53:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by RonO
Post by Kerr-Mudd, John
On Mon, 30 Dec 2024 22:56:48 +1100
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
"If I say it 3 times, then it's true"?
[snipped]
Post by MarkE
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Philosophy;: see DNA -
"what we demand is facts"
"no no, what we demand is rigidly defined areas of uncertainty!"
(from HHGTTG, might not be remembered correctly)
C.S. Lewis doesn't express himself very clearly.  I've read little of
what he's written, but he seems to me to be chasing his tail.
His notions in this regard have never amounted to anything
substantive. What needs to be demonstrated is that they ever will
amount to anything worth discussing further.  By this time you need to
expect something useful to have come out of his arguments.  Why bring
up a subject that everyone else has failed to do anything with for
over half a century? What is the excuse for no one being able to
establish some level of validity to the arguments?  It isn't because
no one has tried.
I bring it up because I think it is a legitimate argument. The counter
argument (e.g. Fodor) seems to partially address this, but not
definitively IMO.
History would seem to indicate that you are wrong. What you need to do
is try to demonstrate that anything has been missed. There has to be
some valid reason other than what you think about it. You really need a
valid reason to counter over half a century of failure.

You, the dishonest ID perps and the creationist rubes that fell for the
ID scam, and the scientific creationists before them likely do not
understand their own beliefs. There should be no existing Christians
that require the type of evidence and reasoning that science relies on
to make progress in understanding nature at this point in the history of
humanity. There are no existing Christians that required scientific
evidence to convert to Christianity or to be born into it. If anyone
claims to have used scientific rational reasoning and evidence to become
a believer everyone should know that they are mistaken. Faith is
irrational. It is supported by nothing more than your "I think"
reasoning. This has never made it less real than what it exists as today.

The ID perps, scientific creationists and you are just wrong in trying
to claim that faith is more than it is. The last IDiots left posting on
TO realized it after decades of lying to themselves about it. They quit
being IDiots because they realized that any science even IDiotic
creation science was never going to support their religious belief in
the Bible. They did not give up on being religious Biblical
creationists, they just gave up on there being any scientific means of
supporting their religious beliefs.

You can't do what you want to do, and you likely shouldn't even try. You
likely need to do what Kalk is likely doing, and looking into trying to
figure out the basis of his faith and religious beliefs rather than
trying to support them with scientific arguments. Really, Kalk claimed
that he was giving up on the ID creationist scam and redirecting his
efforts into his religious beliefs.

I have always been told that your religious beliefs are from your heart
and not your head. It is a feeling that washes through you. I have
never understood why I believe, and I was told that I did not have to
understand it. I just needed to feel it and know that it existed.

Science isn't like that, and even though it is obvious that science
works in terms of understanding the world around us, my take is that it
has always been wrong to try to use science to support religious beliefs.

The other creationists understood what the Top Six meant. You should
understand that it doesn't matter how life originated on this planet
because just what we understand about when it likely happened and under
what conditions means that the Biblical creation story is just wrong.
The earth isn't flat. There is no firmament above us that has to be
opened up to let the rain fall through. We do not live in a geocentric
universe. This has been understood for centuries, and Christianity has
survived in this non Biblical universe. Even though we have some flat
earth creationists today the early church fathers already understood
that the world wasn't flat. They were all likely spherical earth
geocentrists because some Greek had estimated the circumference of the
earth by physical measurements a couple of centuries before Christ was
born. The Bible being wrong about nature has really never been an issue
for those that understood that it wasn't a science textbook from the
beginning of it being put together as the Christian Bible.

Ron Okimoto
Post by MarkE
Post by RonO
This isn't like the ID scam where the reason that no ID science has
ever been attempted is because the Biblical creationists at the ID
scam unit have always expected to fail in accomplishing any valid ID
science, and they definitely never wanted to succeed.  Kalk and Bill
should tell us if they ever wanted the ID perps to succeed in
demonstrating designer did it design for the Top Six best god-of-the-
gaps claims of the ID perps.  The god that fills those gaps is not the
god described in the Bible.
Ron Okimoto
MarkE
2024-12-30 22:58:07 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
On reflection, Folley's appeal to a "thin" metaphysical layer seems like
a sleight-of-hand to technically but not substantively claim to be a
non-materialistic atheist. Or, he is reaching very selectively into a
"thick" metaphysical realm.
Burkhard
2024-12-31 19:31:05 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily
connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?

For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.

So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.

As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
quite often on TO. And yes, one obvious response is:
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.

What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
John Harshman
2024-12-31 22:19:25 UTC
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily
connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing in
addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any expectation
that reason exists.
MarkE
2025-01-01 11:01:26 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing in
addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any expectation
that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the billiard
balls will rebound where they must), then could not an interventionist
God impart the capacity to humans to override this material constraint?

There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?

Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial soul
which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a theist),
I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.

You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
John Harshman
2025-01-01 21:19:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing
in addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any
expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the billiard
balls will rebound where they must), then could not an interventionist
God impart the capacity to humans to override this material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or immaterial.
The alternative to causality is caprice, not rationality. Anyway, we
have no more reason to believe God would enable rationality than to
believe a material universe would.
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result in
rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused cause
that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial soul
which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a theist),
I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same problem
of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
MarkE
2025-01-02 04:46:49 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing
in addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any
expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or immaterial.
The alternative to causality is caprice, not rationality. Anyway, we
have no more reason to believe God would enable rationality than to
believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are all
causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-material soul
that transcends this constraint and allows us to make free and
accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour in this world.

In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause of
those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery or
incomplete knowledge here.

Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical tension
or paradox between human moral accountability and God's sovereign will:

“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)

“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He turns
it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result in
rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused cause
that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial soul
which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a theist),
I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same problem
of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
John Harshman
2025-01-02 05:28:40 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing
in addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any
expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or immaterial.
The alternative to causality is caprice, not rationality. Anyway, we
have no more reason to believe God would enable rationality than to
believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are all
causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-material soul
that transcends this constraint and allows us to make free and
accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour in this world.
In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause of
those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery or
incomplete knowledge here.
Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical tension
“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)
“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He turns
it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
After "no", that's all non sequitur. You have faith that there's
something ineffable that "transcends this constraint", but you concede
that you can't even speculate about what sort of thing that might be. In
defense of rationality you abandon any claim to rationality.
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result
in rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused
cause that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's
incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial
soul which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a
theist), I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same problem
of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
MarkE
2025-01-02 06:59:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a
material universe, adding God or any other non-material entities
does nothing in addition to support reason. It does nothing to
increase any expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or immaterial.
The alternative to causality is caprice, not rationality. Anyway, we
have no more reason to believe God would enable rationality than to
believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are
all causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-
material soul that transcends this constraint and allows us to make
free and accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour in
this world.
In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause
of those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery or
incomplete knowledge here.
Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical
tension or paradox between human moral accountability and God's
“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)
“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He
turns it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
After "no", that's all non sequitur. You have faith that there's
something ineffable that "transcends this constraint", but you concede
that you can't even speculate about what sort of thing that might be. In
defense of rationality you abandon any claim to rationality.
No. I offer a possible third option to necessity and caprice. The fact
that it is speculative and uncertain is a separate issue--a real issue,
yes, but not one that in and of itself negates the logic and rationality
of my proposal. It seems you're confusing/conflating these.
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result
in rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused
cause that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's
incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial
soul which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a
theist), I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same
problem of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
John Harshman
2025-01-05 07:13:31 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a
material universe, adding God or any other non-material entities
does nothing in addition to support reason. It does nothing to
increase any expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or
immaterial. The alternative to causality is caprice, not
rationality. Anyway, we have no more reason to believe God would
enable rationality than to believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are
all causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-
material soul that transcends this constraint and allows us to make
free and accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour
in this world.
In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause
of those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery
or incomplete knowledge here.
Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical
tension or paradox between human moral accountability and God's
“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)
“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He
turns it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
After "no", that's all non sequitur. You have faith that there's
something ineffable that "transcends this constraint", but you concede
that you can't even speculate about what sort of thing that might be.
In defense of rationality you abandon any claim to rationality.
No. I offer a possible third option to necessity and caprice. The fact
that it is speculative and uncertain is a separate issue--a real issue,
yes, but not one that in and of itself negates the logic and rationality
of my proposal. It seems you're confusing/conflating these.
You haven't proposed a third option. You have merely attached a name to
the claim that there might be a third option whose nature is both
inexplicable and, I suggest, is so because it's incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how
does this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result
in rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused
cause that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's
incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial
soul which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a
theist), I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same
problem of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
LDagget
2025-01-05 09:48:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a
material universe, adding God or any other non-material entities
does nothing in addition to support reason. It does nothing to
increase any expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or
immaterial. The alternative to causality is caprice, not
rationality. Anyway, we have no more reason to believe God would
enable rationality than to believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are
all causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-
material soul that transcends this constraint and allows us to make
free and accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour
in this world.
In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause
of those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery
or incomplete knowledge here.
Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical
tension or paradox between human moral accountability and God's
“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)
“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He
turns it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
After "no", that's all non sequitur. You have faith that there's
something ineffable that "transcends this constraint", but you concede
that you can't even speculate about what sort of thing that might be.
In defense of rationality you abandon any claim to rationality.
No. I offer a possible third option to necessity and caprice. The fact
that it is speculative and uncertain is a separate issue--a real issue,
yes, but not one that in and of itself negates the logic and rationality
of my proposal. It seems you're confusing/conflating these.
You haven't proposed a third option. You have merely attached a name to
the claim that there might be a third option whose nature is both
inexplicable and, I suggest, is so because it's incoherent.
When I read
I had a Chez Watt moment. It's quite amazing to begin with an emphatic
negative and pursue it with "... this is only my speculation".

For some time now I've been bombarded with ads for the Grammarly
software
package which is marketed to help people via an AI that suggests ways
to improve their writing. Confession: I'm offended by the program. It's
not because I think kids should walk to school through the snow uphill
both ways sharing one pair of shoes with their brother. It's because I
think that working to write clearly is intrinsically entwined with
working
to think clearly. So I think bypassing the work of cleaning up ones
writing on ones own is bypassing the work of cleaning up ones thinking.

AI to help people avoid thinking sounds like the theme for a dystopian
novel. It also feels like this modern world, as if people needed more
excuses to avoid thinking.

MarkE
2025-01-02 06:59:22 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a
material universe, adding God or any other non-material entities
does nothing in addition to support reason. It does nothing to
increase any expectation that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the
billiard balls will rebound where they must), then could not an
interventionist God impart the capacity to humans to override this
material constraint?
Maybe he could, though it's not really a material constraint. It's a
constraint of causality, whether the cause is material or immaterial.
The alternative to causality is caprice, not rationality. Anyway, we
have no more reason to believe God would enable rationality than to
believe a material universe would.
No. For example (and this is only my own speculation): Christianity
teaches human moral accountability. We protest that our actions are
all causally predetermined. But God has equipped us with a non-
material soul that transcends this constraint and allows us to make
free and accountable choices that in turn manifest in our behaviour in
this world.
In this case, what does "free" mean, and what is the source or cause
of those choices made in that non-material realm? I concede mystery or
incomplete knowledge here.
Furthermore, in Christian theology there is a definite biblical
tension or paradox between human moral accountability and God's
“Each of us will give an account of himself to God.” (Romans 14:12)
“The king’s heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; He
turns it wherever He will.” (Proverbs 21:1)
After "no", that's all non sequitur. You have faith that there's
something ineffable that "transcends this constraint", but you concede
that you can't even speculate about what sort of thing that might be. In
defense of rationality you abandon any claim to rationality.
No. I offer a possible third option to necessity and caprice. The fact
that it is speculative and uncertain is a separate issue--a real issue,
yes, but not one that in and of itself negates the logic and rationality
of my proposal. It seems you're confusing/conflating these.
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
And why isn't it a contradiction in terms? If causality can't result
in rationality, how could caprice? You're looking for an uncaused
cause that is nevertheless influenced by input information. That's
incoherent.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial
soul which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a
theist), I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
An immaterial soul solves nothing. It still confronts the same
problem of causality, caprice, and no third source of rational thought.
Post by MarkE
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
Burkhard
2025-01-02 12:34:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by John Harshman
To put it another way, even if we can't support reason in a material
universe, adding God or any other non-material entities does nothing in
addition to support reason. It does nothing to increase any expectation
that reason exists.
If the thing preventing reason is causal determinism (i.e. the billiard
balls will rebound where they must), then could not an interventionist
God impart the capacity to humans to override this material constraint?
Something not quite right here. Why would causal determinism
"prevent" reason? I don't think anyone is arguing this. What Lewis
and Plantinga argue is that a deterministic theory of the world
is "insufficient" to explain on its own the success of our
reasoning (or maybe something different from "success" as it is
normally understood altogether, they are not very clear on this)

The billiard ball model has one immediate advantage here -
it explains a causal interlinkage between our mental representation
of the world and the external world. Photons really have to
bounce off external objects and then hit our eyes, which then
sends impulses to the neurons in the brain etc etc.

The more you weaken or downplay this causal connection, the
more you separate rather than connect reason and reality, and the
more you are at risk of ending up with a "brain in a vat"
scenario where the third party (designer, God etc) directly
causes the reasoning processes in our brain, and with
other words ensures that the illusion that we mistake for
reality remains coherent.

This may work for some versions of Vedic or Buddhist
religion (we are all just parts of Brahma
dreaming) but definitely not Christian mainstream
Post by MarkE
There remains the question of what is imparted exactly, and how does
this provide the ability to truly reason?
Indeed. The best you can get I'd say is that you replace one
deterministic causal agent with another - that is what
we think of as our reason is really just the way in which
the designer chose to run our collective illusion.
Post by MarkE
Also, I'd be wary of pressing this to a kind of dualism, whereby
(crudely) our physical brains are just a front for the immaterial soul
which is the real brains behind the operation. Equally (as a theist),
I'd be wary of denying the existence of an immaterial soul.
You may have detected that I'm somewhat uncertain of these things.
MarkE
2025-01-01 10:40:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily
connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
Definitions are critical here. If "non-materialist" means belief in the
existence of say numbers and propositions, then that
seems...inconsequential?

And how might we define "existence"? As (i) Platonic forms residing in a
realm outside of this spacetime continuum (which seems tantamount to
belief in the supernatural); or (ii) belief that these concepts,
whatever their existence may entail, do not imply or require anything
supernatural.

It is left to reader to define _supernatural_. And _define_. And _and_.
Post by Burkhard
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
For the major montheistic religions, being a materialist is not an
option. For at least some forms of polytheism and pantheism, yes?
Post by Burkhard
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
I don't see how this implies that God is needed to reconcile material
reality and our sensory perception. E.g., the fact that our visual
system takes clever shortcuts which sometimes leave room for optical
illusions does not make God a trickster. It just reminds us that we are
finite beings.
Burkhard
2025-01-02 12:20:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
Definitions are critical here. If "non-materialist" means belief in the
existence of say numbers and propositions, then that
seems...inconsequential?
I'm not sure what you mean with "inconsequential" in this
context. Materialism is the metaphysical position that
everything that exists can ultimately be reduced to matter.
There are lots of things some people claim exist that
can't be reduced to matter, including numbers and
prepositions, which means these people are not
materialists, whatever else they might think exists.


And on the other hand, there are people who claim
nothing can be reduced to matter (all strong forms
of idealism) and who nonetheless don't think a specific
ideal entity - a god of one form or another - exists.

And that means the while many atheists may well be
also materialists, the two concepts are neither
synonymous nor co-extensional, they are separate issues
Post by MarkE
And how might we define "existence"? As (i) Platonic forms residing in a
realm outside of this spacetime continuum (which seems tantamount to
belief in the supernatural); or (ii) belief that these concepts,
whatever their existence may entail, do not imply or require anything
supernatural.
It is left to reader to define _supernatural_. And _define_. And _and_.
Yes, I'd agree that "supernatural" is pretty much a
meaningless "waste basket" category - typically used for
things that current best theories can't explain but where
some might intuitively feel an explanation is needed.

Whether minds, numbers, propositions etc are then
labelled as supernatural is a bit of a sema ntic question,
I would say no, in normal word use, but nothing depends on
it. They are however definitely not dependent on the
acceptance of any deity, which was the issue.
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
For the major montheistic religions, being a materialist is not an
option. For at least some forms of polytheism and pantheism, yes?
Yes, and possibly also for the Emperor-gods of Japan and
Rome, and similar down-to-earth religions. Within
Christianity, some radical forms of adaptionism might
qualify, but they were always deemed heretical
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
I don't see how this implies that God is needed to reconcile material
reality and our sensory perception. E.g., the fact that our visual
system takes clever shortcuts which sometimes leave room for optical
illusions does not make God a trickster. It just reminds us that we are
finite beings.
But isn't that the entire Lewis-Plantinga argument? According
to them, we need an "additional warrant" to trust our
senses and our reason. which they then locate in the designer.
But that makes the designer also responsible for the
systematic mistakes we make.

The ToE accounts for both - the relative success of our
perception and reason, and that they sometimes fail. As
with all evolutionary "solutions", it is a compromise that
is "good enough", and also heavily path-dependent (some
things that were good a long time ago are still around and
now, under changed conditions, harmful etc). The
creationist alternative also would have to account for both,
and with that makes the systematic failures of our perception
and reason causally attributable to the choices of the designer.

hence a trickster God- or maybe a conflict between equipotent
deities
MarkE
2025-01-03 12:54:41 UTC
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-
materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
Definitions are critical here. If "non-materialist" means belief in the
existence of say numbers and propositions, then that
seems...inconsequential?
I'm not sure what you mean with "inconsequential" in this
context. Materialism is the metaphysical position that
everything that exists can ultimately be reduced to matter.
There are lots of things some people claim exist that
can't be reduced to matter, including numbers and
prepositions, which means these people are not
materialists, whatever else they might think exists.
And on the other hand, there are people who claim
nothing can be reduced to matter (all strong forms
of idealism) and who nonetheless don't think a specific
ideal entity - a god of one form or another - exists.
And that means the while many atheists may well be
also materialists, the two concepts are neither
synonymous nor co-extensional, they are separate issues
There seems to be a useful distinction to made here between the "thin"
nonmaterial notion that Folley describes, alongside what I'd call a
"thick" version (at risk of handing a pun on a plate).

The thin version is unavoidable even for a strict materialist. For
example, natural numbers (1, 2, 3, ...) unavoidably "exist"
conceptually, as an abstraction of counting material objects. Does this
mean a strict materialist must deny the abstraction of natural numbers
to remain a materialist?
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
And how might we define "existence"? As (i) Platonic forms residing in a
realm outside of this spacetime continuum (which seems tantamount to
belief in the supernatural); or (ii) belief that these concepts,
whatever their existence may entail, do not imply or require anything
supernatural.
It is left to reader to define _supernatural_. And _define_. And _and_.
Yes, I'd agree that "supernatural" is pretty much a
meaningless "waste basket" category - typically used for
things that current best theories can't explain but where
some might intuitively feel an explanation is needed.
Whether minds, numbers, propositions etc are then
labelled as supernatural is a bit of  a sema ntic question,
I would say no, in normal word use, but nothing depends on
it. They are however definitely not dependent on the
acceptance of any deity, which was the issue.
Agree that numbers, propositions etc do not seem dependent on the
acceptance of any deity.
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
For the major montheistic religions, being a materialist is not an
option. For at least some forms of polytheism and pantheism, yes?
Yes, and possibly also for the Emperor-gods of Japan and
Rome, and similar down-to-earth religions. Within
Christianity, some radical forms of adaptionism might
qualify, but they were always deemed heretical
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
I don't see how this implies that God is needed to reconcile material
reality and our sensory perception. E.g., the fact that our visual
system takes clever shortcuts which sometimes leave room for optical
illusions does not make God a trickster. It just reminds us that we are
finite beings.
But isn't that the entire Lewis-Plantinga argument? According
to them, we need an "additional warrant" to trust our
senses and our reason. which they then locate in the designer.
But that makes the designer also responsible for the
systematic mistakes we make.
The ToE accounts for both - the relative success of our
perception and reason, and that they sometimes fail. As
with all evolutionary "solutions", it is a compromise that
is "good enough", and also heavily path-dependent (some
things that were good a long time ago are still around and
now, under changed conditions, harmful etc). The
creationist alternative also would have to account for both,
and with that makes the systematic failures of our perception
and reason causally attributable to the choices of the designer.
hence a trickster God- or maybe a conflict between equipotent
deities
It would be conventional to say that God makes allowances for our human
limitations and sensory errors. At a fair and just school, a student is
not condemned for not getting 100% in a test; they are in trouble for
cheating, bullying, etc. Our moral accountability suggests that we are
not robots whose actions are entirely bound by causal determinism.
Kerr-Mudd, John
2025-01-03 13:14:04 UTC
Permalink
On Fri, 3 Jan 2025 23:54:41 +1100
MarkE <***@gmail.com> wrote:

[Major snip]
[about cardinal numbers]
Post by MarkE
It would be conventional to say that God makes allowances for our human
limitations and sensory errors. At a fair and just school, a student is
not condemned for not getting 100% in a test; they are in trouble for
cheating, bullying, etc. Our moral accountability suggests that we are
not robots whose actions are entirely bound by causal determinism.
Are moral sensibilities so easily dismissed as unknowable without a god?
Try "tit-for-tat" as an [at minimum] "ethical" strategy. It works
without any divine intervention.
--
Bah, and indeed, Humbug
Burkhard
2025-01-03 21:43:06 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-
materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
Definitions are critical here. If "non-materialist" means belief in the
existence of say numbers and propositions, then that
seems...inconsequential?
I'm not sure what you mean with "inconsequential" in this
context. Materialism is the metaphysical position that
everything that exists can ultimately be reduced to matter.
There are lots of things some people claim exist that
can't be reduced to matter, including numbers and
prepositions, which means these people are not
materialists, whatever else they might think exists.
And on the other hand, there are people who claim
nothing can be reduced to matter (all strong forms
of idealism) and who nonetheless don't think a specific
ideal entity - a god of one form or another - exists.
And that means the while many atheists may well be
also materialists, the two concepts are neither
synonymous nor co-extensional, they are separate issues
There seems to be a useful distinction to made here between the "thin"
nonmaterial notion that Folley describes, alongside what I'd call a
"thick" version (at risk of handing a pun on a plate).
The thin version is unavoidable even for a strict materialist. For
example, natural numbers (1, 2, 3, ...) unavoidably "exist"
conceptually, as an abstraction of counting material objects. Does this
mean a strict materialist must deny the abstraction of natural numbers
to remain a materialist?
no, not necessarily. There are lots of "ontologically undemanding"
theories of numbers - for instance "operationalist" approaches
that conceptualise them through the act of counting, or nominalist
approaches that treat them as mere uninterpreted symbols with
rewriting rules.

But some philosophers and mathematicians always argued
for stronger ontological commitments, a platonic, mind
independent heavens of concepts that describe a different
type of reality (great V, the set-theoretical universe e.g.).

And there have been historically theists and atheists
on both sides.
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
And how might we define "existence"? As (i) Platonic forms residing in a
realm outside of this spacetime continuum (which seems tantamount to
belief in the supernatural); or (ii) belief that these concepts,
whatever their existence may entail, do not imply or require anything
supernatural.
It is left to reader to define _supernatural_. And _define_. And _and_.
Yes, I'd agree that "supernatural" is pretty much a
meaningless "waste basket" category - typically used for
things that current best theories can't explain but where
some might intuitively feel an explanation is needed.
Whether minds, numbers, propositions etc are then
labelled as supernatural is a bit of  a sema ntic question,
I would say no, in normal word use, but nothing depends on
it. They are however definitely not dependent on the
acceptance of any deity, which was the issue.
Agree that numbers, propositions etc do not seem dependent on the
acceptance of any deity.
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
For the major montheistic religions, being a materialist is not an
option. For at least some forms of polytheism and pantheism, yes?
Yes, and possibly also for the Emperor-gods of Japan and
Rome, and similar down-to-earth religions. Within
Christianity, some radical forms of adaptionism might
qualify, but they were always deemed heretical
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
I don't see how this implies that God is needed to reconcile material
reality and our sensory perception. E.g., the fact that our visual
system takes clever shortcuts which sometimes leave room for optical
illusions does not make God a trickster. It just reminds us that we are
finite beings.
But isn't that the entire Lewis-Plantinga argument? According
to them, we need an "additional warrant" to trust our
senses and our reason. which they then locate in the designer.
But that makes the designer also responsible for the
systematic mistakes we make.
The ToE accounts for both - the relative success of our
perception and reason, and that they sometimes fail. As
with all evolutionary "solutions", it is a compromise that
is "good enough", and also heavily path-dependent (some
things that were good a long time ago are still around and
now, under changed conditions, harmful etc). The
creationist alternative also would have to account for both,
and with that makes the systematic failures of our perception
and reason causally attributable to the choices of the designer.
hence a trickster God- or maybe a conflict between equipotent
deities
It would be conventional to say that God makes allowances for our human
limitations and sensory errors. At a fair and just school, a student is
not condemned for not getting 100% in a test; they are in trouble for
cheating, bullying, etc. Our moral accountability suggests that we are
not robots whose actions are entirely bound by causal determinism.
I don't think that works, for several reasons. First, the "human
limitations
and sensory errors" are in the Lewis Plantinga approach a design feature
-
they have to be once evolution as causal explanation is rejected. Which
is of course why Darwin was immediately embraced by quite a number of
Christian theologians, as a way to get God off the hook for quite a
lot of stuff. What you can't do, and remain logically consistent, is to
go down the Lewis Plantinga argument and then treat the systematic
perception errors as not divinely ordained. And that's also John
H's argument - once you think it through, their approach severs
all necessary connections between our environment and our ability
to reason about it.

The second part of the above I find even more difficult to follow.
Why are you now shifting from the reliability of perception and
factual reasoning in a deterministic universe (The Lewis point) to
one about moral reasons and moral accountability?

In any case, you have the same problems there. Yes, some
people claim that determinism and moral accountability are
incompatible with each other. But I'd argue the opposite is true,
and the libertarian model of free will that rejects causal
determinism does not lead to responsibility, but insanity.
Causality is a prerequisite for any type of responsibility,
otherwise you are left with random muscle spasms
MarkE
2025-01-04 12:37:42 UTC
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism, and discusses the possibility of non-materialistic atheism
"In a recent video by the underrated YouTube channel Emerson Green, he
points out that in modern popular discourse, we often use the terms
atheism and materialism as if they are totally interchangeable. Lewis
arguably falls into this trap as well when he suggests that if his
argument from reason succeeds, then this is good evidence for God’s
existence. In his video, Green largely talks about the examples of
non-materialist atheism from the philosophy of mind, but I want to
expand upon this point because there is a whole world of non-
materialist
atheism to explore. And a lot of it is far less ridiculous than you
might first think."
"The Hidden Problem with EVERY Atheist Argument"
http://youtu.be/Q1jQscSNtNU
(Don't be put off by the title)
Two thoughts on this: equating materialism with atheism is
indeed nonsense. Why should a specific opinion about the
existence of deities prejudge one's view of the existence
of numbers, minds, fictional objects, propositions,
etc etc?
For TO purposes Godfrey Harold Hardy comes to mind -
an outspoken atheist who nonetheless (In "A mathematician's
apology") embraces mathematical platonism. Bertrand Russell's
neutral monism isn't materialism either. Schopenhauer was
clearly an atheist, but also a key figure in the
idealist movement etc etc.
Definitions are critical here. If "non-materialist" means belief in the
existence of say numbers and propositions, then that
seems...inconsequential?
I'm not sure what you mean with "inconsequential" in this
context. Materialism is the metaphysical position that
everything that exists can ultimately be reduced to matter.
There are lots of things some people claim exist that
can't be reduced to matter, including numbers and
prepositions, which means these people are not
materialists, whatever else they might think exists.
And on the other hand, there are people who claim
nothing can be reduced to matter (all strong forms
of idealism) and who nonetheless don't think a specific
ideal entity - a god of one form or another - exists.
And that means the while many atheists may well be
also materialists, the two concepts are neither
synonymous nor co-extensional, they are separate issues
There seems to be a useful distinction to made here between the "thin"
nonmaterial notion that Folley describes, alongside what I'd call a
"thick" version (at risk of handing a pun on a plate).
The thin version is unavoidable even for a strict materialist. For
example, natural numbers (1, 2, 3, ...) unavoidably "exist"
conceptually, as an abstraction of counting material objects. Does this
mean a strict materialist must deny the abstraction of natural numbers
to remain a materialist?
no, not necessarily. There are lots of "ontologically undemanding"
theories of numbers - for instance "operationalist" approaches
that conceptualise them through the act of counting, or nominalist
approaches that treat them as mere uninterpreted symbols with
rewriting rules.
But some philosophers and mathematicians always argued
for stronger ontological commitments, a platonic, mind
independent heavens of concepts that describe a different
type of reality (great V, the set-theoretical universe e.g.).
And there have been historically theists and atheists
on both sides.
That seems in line what I'm saying (with admittedly limited knowledge of
this area of philosophy). The terminology of "ontologically
undemanding", "operationalist" and "nominal" approaches seem apt.
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
And how might we define "existence"? As (i) Platonic forms residing in a
realm outside of this spacetime continuum (which seems tantamount to
belief in the supernatural); or (ii) belief that these concepts,
whatever their existence may entail, do not imply or require anything
supernatural.
It is left to reader to define _supernatural_. And _define_. And _and_.
Yes, I'd agree that "supernatural" is pretty much a
meaningless "waste basket" category - typically used for
things that current best theories can't explain but where
some might intuitively feel an explanation is needed.
Whether minds, numbers, propositions etc are then
labelled as supernatural is a bit of a sema ntic question,
I would say no, in normal word use, but nothing depends on
it. They are however definitely not dependent on the
acceptance of any deity, which was the issue.
Agree that numbers, propositions etc do not seem dependent on the
acceptance of any deity.
Post by Burkhard
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
So most certainly not all atheists are materialists.
I'm not even sure the converse is true, though that
could be more debatable.
For the major montheistic religions, being a materialist is not an
option. For at least some forms of polytheism and pantheism, yes?
Yes, and possibly also for the Emperor-gods of Japan and
Rome, and similar down-to-earth religions. Within
Christianity, some radical forms of adaptionism might
qualify, but they were always deemed heretical
Post by MarkE
Post by Burkhard
As for the Lewis-Plantinga argument, that has come up
"mistake the sabre tooth tiger for a pussy cat once too
often, and see what it does for your reproductive success"
At least a significant part of our perception has
to be truth-tracking to enable survival and evolutionary
epistemology (Ruse, Rescher, Vollmer, etc) take this to
the very heart of the epistemological endeavour.
What is missing in your account is the converse here.
Evolutionary epistemology does not only explain why
our perception has to be truth tracking "often enough",
it also explains why it can sometimes fail, and thus
accounts also for things like optical illusions and
other common mistakes. But these are a real problem
for the creationists' side: if as they argue God is
necessary to cause an alignment between reality and
perception, then He/She/they are also causal for those
situations where perception systematically fails. So
you end up either with a trickster God or dualism
where the anti-God has creative abilities or some
another ad hoc fix that comes at a significant
theological costs,
I don't see how this implies that God is needed to reconcile material
reality and our sensory perception. E.g., the fact that our visual
system takes clever shortcuts which sometimes leave room for optical
illusions does not make God a trickster. It just reminds us that we are
finite beings.
But isn't that the entire Lewis-Plantinga argument? According
to them, we need an "additional warrant" to trust our
senses and our reason. which they then locate in the designer.
But that makes the designer also responsible for the
systematic mistakes we make.
The ToE accounts for both - the relative success of our
perception and reason, and that they sometimes fail. As
with all evolutionary "solutions", it is a compromise that
is "good enough", and also heavily path-dependent (some
things that were good a long time ago are still around and
now, under changed conditions, harmful etc). The
creationist alternative also would have to account for both,
and with that makes the systematic failures of our perception
and reason causally attributable to the choices of the designer.
hence a trickster God- or maybe a conflict between equipotent
deities
It would be conventional to say that God makes allowances for our human
limitations and sensory errors. At a fair and just school, a student is
not condemned for not getting 100% in a test; they are in trouble for
cheating, bullying, etc. Our moral accountability suggests that we are
not robots whose actions are entirely bound by causal determinism.
I don't think that works, for several reasons. First, the "human
limitations
and sensory errors" are in the Lewis Plantinga approach a design feature
-
they have to be once evolution as causal explanation is rejected. Which
is of course why Darwin was immediately embraced by quite a number of
Christian theologians, as a way to get God off the hook for quite a
lot of stuff. What you can't do, and remain logically consistent, is to
go down the Lewis Plantinga argument and then treat the systematic
perception errors as not divinely ordained. And that's also John
H's argument - once you think it through, their approach severs
all necessary connections between our environment and our ability
to reason about it.
I may be missing something here, but a few thoughts around this.

Does it necessarily reflect badly on the creator if we are created with
say 95% sensory perception accuracy, with varying degrees of awareness
of this limitation, as well as cognitive limitations etc? Arguably, it
is a logical impossibility for any finite material creature to not have
such limitations.

Regardless, if full causal determinism applies in the material world,
and we live in this world, then it would appear that we have no ability
to make choices. To address this, one (speculative) option is a
nonmaterial component of our being that interacts with and overrides the
chemistry or quantum behaviour of our brains.
Post by Burkhard
The second part of the above I find even more difficult to follow.
Why are you now shifting from the reliability of perception and
factual reasoning in a deterministic universe (The Lewis point) to
one about moral reasons and moral accountability?
In any case, you have the same problems there. Yes, some
people claim that determinism and moral accountability are
incompatible with each other. But I'd argue the opposite is true,
and the libertarian model of free will that rejects causal
determinism does not lead to responsibility, but insanity.
Causality is a prerequisite for any type of responsibility,
otherwise you are left with random muscle spasms
It does seems that the notion of true "free will" is not popular with
physicists. But as you say, the libertarian model has it's own problems.
Various forms of compatibilism at least offer frameworks to make life
liveable at some level.
Mark Isaak
2025-01-04 16:59:44 UTC
Permalink
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic (_in
principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if this
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only particles
and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal relationships.
In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain states caused by
non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this means the rationality
of thought processes is an illusion. If materialism is true, then there
are no reasons, only causes. Thus, materialism undermines reason itself."
This argument assumes that humans are reasonable, which even a casual
look at history or current events should quickly dispel. Yes, we have
some reasoning ability, but it is the minority of our thought processes.
Post by MarkE
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's YouTube
channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He describes
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of the
world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs and
yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs are a
big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we need
to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there, they
can hurt us."
Fodor seems to have a one-dimensional view of mentality. I'll respond by
raising a question. Do you suppose emotions have any survival advantage?
Post by MarkE
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism [...]
Well duh. There's an infinite possibility of non-materialistic non-gods.
Besides Fodor's example of Plato's forms, ghosts are another possibility.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Ernest Major
2025-01-04 23:03:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by MarkE
I'm (tentatively) conceding some ground in this post against CS Lewis.
So no particular argument here; just for your end-of-year enjoyment.
If causality holds universally, then the universe is deterministic
(_in principle_, and aside from quantum indeterminism).
Different versions of compatibilism attempt to reconcile causal
determinism with free will to varying degrees. I'm not intending to go
down that rabbit hole here——I'm wondering instead about rationality,
reason, and materialism. Here's a one claimed problem (apologies if
"C.S. Lewis, in his work Miracles, builds an argument from the oddness
of reason, claiming that a materialist-atheist view of reality is
untenable. Imagine a purely materialist world: a world of only
particles and matter, with no purpose or normativity——only causal
relationships. In this world, reasoning becomes just a series of brain
states caused by non-rational processes. According to Lewis, this
means the rationality of thought processes is an illusion. If
materialism is true, then there are no reasons, only causes. Thus,
materialism undermines reason itself."
This argument assumes that humans are reasonable, which even a casual
look at history or current events should quickly dispel. Yes, we have
some reasoning ability, but it is the minority of our thought processes.
Post by MarkE
The algorithm read my mind and gave me an answer at Joe Folley's
YouTube channel Unsolicited Advice (which I highly recommend). He
"...Plantinga argues, there is no reason to think that survival and
having access to capital-T metaphysical truth are necessarily
connected..."
"...For Fodor, sure, our ability to reason's overall job is to help us
survive, but it does this through letting us know what the state of
the world is—that is, what is true and what we can deduce from what we
already know is true. At the very least, he suggests it needs to be
shown how exactly a creature could have mostly or all false beliefs
and yet still somehow be well-suited for survival. After all, beliefs
are a big part of what guides behavior, and if we want to successfully
interact with the world—that is, to achieve our aims of survival and
reproduction—we had better have true beliefs about how the world will
respond when we perform certain actions. Or, to use an example, we
need to know where the tigers actually are, because if they are there,
they can hurt us."
Fodor seems to have a one-dimensional view of mentality. I'll respond by
raising a question. Do you suppose emotions have any survival advantage?
Post by MarkE
Interestingly, he then goes on to disagree that atheism implies
materialism [...]
Well duh. There's an infinite possibility of non-materialistic non-gods.
Besides Fodor's example of Plato's forms, ghosts are another possibility.
Nowadays people talk about physicalism, because energy and fields are
more fundamental than matter.
--
alias Ernest Major
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