Discussion:
Making your mind up
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Martin Harran
2024-04-05 16:05:07 UTC
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Permalink
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.

One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?

Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?

A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
Arkalen
2024-04-05 17:19:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.

In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
Martin Harran
2024-04-06 08:18:33 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
Post by Arkalen
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
Arkalen
2024-04-06 18:51:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).


If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).


The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 08:52:58 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).
If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.
I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants
watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very
difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
"little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
detected activity.

Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
driving.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
Arkalen
2024-04-09 09:01:24 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).
If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.
I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants
watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very
difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
"little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
detected activity.
Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
driving.
Right, and in that example the actual decision to press the button would
be made in the alert state - "by the little man at the back of my head".
Whereas when driving "on autopilot" all the driving decisions are NOT
being made by the little man. An event that triggers his activation,
like seeing the playing children, takes you out of autopilot mode at the
same time.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
Martin Harran
2024-04-10 09:18:31 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).
If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.
I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants
watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very
difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
"little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
detected activity.
Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
driving.
Right, and in that example the actual decision to press the button would
be made in the alert state - "by the little man at the back of my head".
Whereas when driving "on autopilot" all the driving decisions are NOT
being made by the little man. An event that triggers his activation,
like seeing the playing children, takes you out of autopilot mode at the
same time.
Whilst specific events can trigger activation, I think that the
'little man' is also keeping an eye on things we should be doing and
may remind us if we are not doing something that we should be doing.
I'm suggesting that something along those lines might be happening in
the Libet experiments.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
DB Cates
2024-04-05 21:29:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-06 07:38:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
LDagget
2024-04-06 10:22:18 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?

The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.

The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.

Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.

Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)

To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.

The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.

An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
DB Cates
2024-04-06 23:00:21 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point. Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot
walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. Map it
into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
It's not the way I would have made the argument, but it covers my point
pretty well

I would like to make the point that my view of determinism does not lead
to a fixed future except in the very short term. I think it is fairly
clear that random, probabilistic variability is part of our universe and
this makes prediction of just which deterministic future we end up in
impossible. But Random variation stuck on top of determinism doesn't
offer much comfort to the 'little invisible, supernatural man in my head
pushing my brain around' crowd.
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions to the
subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-07 15:01:51 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
DB Cates
2024-04-07 18:24:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*.
How do you know that that actually happens? In the 'free will' situation
why does a delay happen? And how does any explanation you give
distinguish from a deterministic situation?

Once all the
Post by Martin Harran
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function;
Dagget's robot description makes the "just hang about for a while"
function eminently pointed.

no matter how
Post by Martin Harran
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
As I understand it, the 'hidden variables' idea in physics is pretty
much defunct, so there is some randomness built in to the universe. T
his effects my idea of determinism to make it only predictable
probablistically. Highly accurate in the short term but poor in the long
term. How does the 'free will' idea handle it (randomness)?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Arkalen
2024-04-08 08:19:01 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).

Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.

It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.

Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.


The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.


If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time. And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 09:09:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.

Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
Arkalen
2024-04-09 09:22:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
That's where I plead ignorance of the previous discussion and therefore
the full context of this one. In what sense were people arguing the
decision was "pre-determined"? Like, was it a "the decision has been
made by the brain before we know it" thing like the Libet experiments,
or more of a "the outcome of the decision is baked into the Universe's
initial conditions" thing?

I'm also not sure what you meant by "after all the information has been
processed" if you agree that "sleeping on it" probably involves
information processing of some kind.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
Martin Harran
2024-04-10 09:12:35 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
That's where I plead ignorance of the previous discussion and therefore
the full context of this one. In what sense were people arguing the
decision was "pre-determined"? Like, was it a "the decision has been
made by the brain before we know it" thing like the Libet experiments,
or more of a "the outcome of the decision is baked into the Universe's
initial conditions" thing?
I'm also not sure what you meant by "after all the information has been
processed" if you agree that "sleeping on it" probably involves
information processing of some kind.
I meant that all the information available has already been
considered, the processing during sleep is just rehashing the same
information.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
DB Cates
2024-04-09 15:11:52 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 15:26:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
DB Cates
2024-04-09 16:29:22 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
???
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-10 08:57:20 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
???
Your solution is getting too convoluted.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
DB Cates
2024-04-10 14:51:35 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
???
Your solution is getting too convoluted.
now = some very short duration
What happens now depends on the conditions now.
The conditions now depend on what happened previously.
What's convoluted about that?

Free will depends on the existence of some sort of supernatural agency.
So who is adding unnecessary agents?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-11 07:21:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
???
Your solution is getting too convoluted.
now = some very short duration
What happens now depends on the conditions now.
The conditions now depend on what happened previously.
What's convoluted about that?
That's not quite what you said above, at least as I understood it. You
seemed to be saying that determinism doesn't only make my decision in
advance, by pre-determining the changes in conditions that will affect
me making the decision, it effectively determines the processes that I
will go through to reach it, even determining that I will spend the
night tossing and turning about the decision. That's what I meant by
too convoluted. Your argument is starting to sound more and more like
someone who is convinced of a particular answer and will either ignore
or endlessly manipulate contrary indicators to squeeze in the answer
they want. TBH, I don't see a heap of difference between that and, for
example, Ron Dean's weaving his way around contradictions to his
arguments to maintain his belief in ID.
Post by DB Cates
Free will depends on the existence of some sort of supernatural agency.
So who is adding unnecessary agents?
I'll respond about supernatural in the other post.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
Post by LDagget
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
--
Mark Isaak
2024-04-19 01:36:48 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time, and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
FromTheRafters
2024-04-19 08:56:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* all
been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, ease of
cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and one or two
others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly tradeoffs midst all that
data that cannot be expressed in six-variable differential equation, much
less in something that you could decide by reasoning. Furthermore, there are
innumerable other factors that the decider probably did not consider on the
first pass (how does it look in various other lightings? What, if anything,
would it imply about our social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt
Agatha's horrible kitchen?) All of that processing takes time, and since it
is way too complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best
when the brain is otherwise at rest.
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined. But
that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of competence.
You are wrong there, but it is true that a deterministic process can
produce 'random looking' output but it is deterministically chaotic not
really random. Outside of cryptography, chaotic is random enough for
most purposes.
Arkalen
2024-04-19 09:10:05 UTC
Reply
Permalink
snip
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot the
temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the other
hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year you'll get
a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe a rising
trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left with random
noise that represents the within-year variation. The same thing can be
"random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice of x-axis!
Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two variables (or
more specifically, the lack thereof).


I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies what
variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how is a
coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's random *with
respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can make as to what
the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with respect to
precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond before it lands,
but that's not what it's being asked to be random with respect to.


Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation" means
"random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial, harmful or
neutral for the organism".


In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to go
on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random even
though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as random
processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what decision gets
made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons that might
otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not uncorrelated
(because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the third party to
tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of the decision as
having been "random".


From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
DB Cates
2024-04-20 16:11:18 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot the
temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the other
hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year you'll get
a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe a rising
trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left with random
noise that represents the within-year variation. The same thing can be
"random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice of x-axis!
Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two variables (or
more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies what
variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how is a
coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's random *with
respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can make as to what
the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with respect to
precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond before it lands,
but that's not what it's being asked to be random with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation" means
"random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial, harmful or
neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to go
on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random even
though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as random
processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what decision gets
made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons that might
otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not uncorrelated
(because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the third party to
tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of the decision as
having been "random".
From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free
will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Arkalen
2024-04-20 17:57:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot
the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the
other hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year
you'll get a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe
a rising trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left
with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same
thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice
of x-axis! Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two
variables (or more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies
what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how
is a coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's
random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can
make as to what the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with
respect to precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond
before it lands, but that's not what it's being asked to be random
with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation"
means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial,
harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to
go on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random
even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as
random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what
decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons
that might otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not
uncorrelated (because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the
third party to tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of
the decision as having been "random".
 From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free
will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
There have been many participants in this conversation; in this case the
two directly involved in this mention of random number generators were
Martin Harran and LDagget, who might have had their own ideas of what
they meant by the concept. But thank you for explaining what you mean by
the term, it really goes to show that it's a very, vary ambiguous word
to be using blithely in this kind of discussion! (which isn't to say we
shouldn't use it, I think there's a reason that we do, but yeah let's
not assume we all agree on what it means or implies).

Something I could have added but didn't think in the moment is that it
also depends what we mean by "determinism". Like, if it's "the decision
could be predicted from full knowledge of the person's brain and their
pro and con list" then some forms of randomness used to split ties could
genuinely get in the way of that, it really depends on whether we add
the random factor into the scope of info that would allow us to
perfectly predict the decision. If it's "fated by the initial conditions
of the Universe", less so. Like, there's quantum, but that induces its
own issues in terms of free will (i.e. what we think of as "free will"
should be neither determinate or random; its naïve form requires that
decisions be caused by the person's will, and only by the person's will,
and neither determinism or randomness at their most naïve seem to
satisfy the constraint)
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-21 14:21:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by DB Cates
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot
the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the
other hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year
you'll get a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe
a rising trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left
with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same
thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice
of x-axis! Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two
variables (or more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies
what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how
is a coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's
random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can
make as to what the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with
respect to precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond
before it lands, but that's not what it's being asked to be random
with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation"
means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial,
harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to
go on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random
even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as
random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what
decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons
that might otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not
uncorrelated (because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the
third party to tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of
the decision as having been "random".
 From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free
will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
There have been many participants in this conversation; in this case the
two directly involved in this mention of random number generators were
Martin Harran and LDagget, who might have had their own ideas of what
they meant by the concept. But thank you for explaining what you mean by
the term, it really goes to show that it's a very, vary ambiguous word
to be using blithely in this kind of discussion! (which isn't to say we
shouldn't use it, I think there's a reason that we do, but yeah let's
not assume we all agree on what it means or implies).
Something I could have added but didn't think in the moment is that it
also depends what we mean by "determinism". Like, if it's "the decision
could be predicted from full knowledge of the person's brain and their
pro and con list" then some forms of randomness used to split ties could
genuinely get in the way of that, it really depends on whether we add
the random factor into the scope of info that would allow us to
perfectly predict the decision. If it's "fated by the initial conditions
of the Universe", less so. Like, there's quantum, but that induces its
own issues in terms of free will (i.e. what we think of as "free will"
should be neither determinate or random; its naïve form requires that
decisions be caused by the person's will, and only by the person's will,
and neither determinism or randomness at their most naïve seem to
satisfy the constraint)
It should be said, given he was a proponent of a version of free will, that
Daniel Dennett has passed away.
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 09:15:19 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by DB Cates
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot
the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the
other hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year
you'll get a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe
a rising trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left
with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same
thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice
of x-axis! Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two
variables (or more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies
what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how
is a coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's
random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can
make as to what the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with
respect to precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond
before it lands, but that's not what it's being asked to be random
with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation"
means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial,
harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to
go on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random
even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as
random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what
decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons
that might otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not
uncorrelated (because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the
third party to tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of
the decision as having been "random".
 From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free
will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
There have been many participants in this conversation; in this case the
two directly involved in this mention of random number generators were
Martin Harran and LDagget, who might have had their own ideas of what
they meant by the concept.
It was LDagget who introduced it; I took him to mean a mental toss of
a coin when decisions are about equal in assessment but he seems to
have left the room without expanding further.
Post by Arkalen
But thank you for explaining what you mean by
the term, it really goes to show that it's a very, vary ambiguous word
to be using blithely in this kind of discussion! (which isn't to say we
shouldn't use it, I think there's a reason that we do, but yeah let's
not assume we all agree on what it means or implies).
Something I could have added but didn't think in the moment is that it
also depends what we mean by "determinism". Like, if it's "the decision
could be predicted from full knowledge of the person's brain and their
pro and con list" then some forms of randomness used to split ties could
genuinely get in the way of that, it really depends on whether we add
the random factor into the scope of info that would allow us to
perfectly predict the decision. If it's "fated by the initial conditions
of the Universe", less so. Like, there's quantum, but that induces its
own issues in terms of free will (i.e. what we think of as "free will"
should be neither determinate or random; its naïve form requires that
decisions be caused by the person's will, and only by the person's will,
and neither determinism or randomness at their most naïve seem to
satisfy the constraint)
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 09:12:52 UTC
Reply
Permalink
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.

What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Mark Isaak
2024-04-24 15:45:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving. As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Martin Harran
2024-04-26 07:27:18 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it
signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
Ernest Major
2024-04-26 11:42:17 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions
and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may
be different.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with
the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred,
i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it
signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
--
alias Ernest Major
Martin Harran
2024-04-27 07:20:10 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 12:42:17 +0100, Ernest Major
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions
and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may
be different.
I don't see how that matters, according to determinism, those changes
in conditions and/or agent have in turn been determined by previous
events. That is where you get into an endless regression leading us to
the conclusion that I just quoted to Mark that "… as soon as the Big
Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the
universe was already settled."
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with
the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred,
i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
No, I'm not making that assumption. The pondering may change the
decision but it's nstill only changing to a decision that is already
determined. The question I'm asking is in terms of Cost vs Benefits -
if determinism is true, what benefit is gained from the cost in terms
of brain activity of that pondering?
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it
signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
Arkalen
2024-04-27 08:56:54 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 12:42:17 +0100, Ernest Major
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions
and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may
be different.
I don't see how that matters, according to determinism, those changes
in conditions and/or agent have in turn been determined by previous
events. That is where you get into an endless regression leading us to
the conclusion that I just quoted to Mark that "… as soon as the Big
Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the
universe was already settled."
Right but "everything is predetermined because causes lead to effects
and you can trace back the process to the initial conditions of the
Universe" is very different from "everything is predetermined because
effects will happen regardless of a cause".

The first allows one to use causal language, the other one is plain
false (because it uses causal language and says things with it that are
incorrect). There is a third take on determinism that repudiates causal
language entirely, saying "events follow each other according to a
certain pattern but we can't call them 'cause' and 'effect' because that
language relies on the counterfactual of 'what if that cause hadn't
happened' but no such counterfactual exists".

Asking "why do we ponder when the decision is predetermined" is the
second; it's suggesting that the decision being predetermined means it
has no relationship (be it causal in the first interpretation of merely
correlative in the third) to the pondering. But that is very obviously
not the world we live in: whether predetermined or not, future events
are correlated with past events.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with
the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred,
i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
No, I'm not making that assumption. The pondering may change the
decision but it's nstill only changing to a decision that is already
determined. The question I'm asking is in terms of Cost vs Benefits -
if determinism is true, what benefit is gained from the cost in terms
of brain activity of that pondering?
You're framing *pondering itself* as a decision - should I ponder on
this decision or not? What are the costs and benefits? And that's fair
because the choice to ponder or not and for how long *is* a decision we
make. But if your take is that determinism means that the outcomes of
decisions are predetermined regardless of what we do, then the same is
true of the decision to ponder or not. There is no "cost-benefit
analysis", it's just the inevitable outcome of past events.

If you want to think of "pondering" as an evolutionary adaptation that
"cost-benefit analysis" is a relevant metric to you can do that, it's
just a different perspective on the same phenomenon. But can't apply one
perspective to "pondering" and the opposite perspective to "the decision
being pondered" in the same sentence.

It would be like saying "why does natural selection favor dark moths
when whether they get eaten or not is predetermined?". Yeah, it's
predetermined... *in part by the moth's color*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Ernest Major
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it
signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
Mark Isaak
2024-04-26 16:32:27 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."

That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.

That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Bob Casanova
2024-04-26 23:27:55 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
--
Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov
Mark Isaak
2024-04-27 23:50:12 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Bob Casanova
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
[...]
Post by Mark Isaak
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Martin Harran
2024-04-28 16:42:44 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Bob Casanova
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
[...]
Post by Mark Isaak
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two.
Perhaps you should contact all those philosophers who spend so much
time debating the difference and tell them they are wasting their
time.
Post by Mark Isaak
And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
Bob Casanova
2024-04-28 17:32:25 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Bob Casanova
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
[...]
Post by Mark Isaak
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false. And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself. Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
Bob C.

"The most exciting phrase to hear in science,
the one that heralds new discoveries, is not
'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...'"

- Isaac Asimov
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-29 02:25:51 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Bob Casanova
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Bob Casanova
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
[...]
Post by Mark Isaak
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false. And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself. Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
I’m a partisan toward qualia myself, but would like to point out it is
nearly synonymous with the bugbear term “lived experience” which makes it
all the more amusing.

I think the problem with conceptualizing free will is on the one hand it’s
popular kneejerk equivalence with libertarianism and on the other hand the
common focus on Libet type experiments that find neural antecedents that
occur only a short time before an action and the perception that one has
previewed it and enacted it. Deliberation over longer periods of time and
the self-control to squelch impulsive interference are the more interesting
things at play.
Martin Harran
2024-04-27 06:57:39 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by LDagget
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Post by Mark Isaak
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
events:

"If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed.
And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.

Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to
decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if
determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier
events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going
back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events
involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.

So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were
born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
do not have free will."

https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/

That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.
DB Cates
2024-04-06 22:48:09 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.

You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-07 15:25:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?

In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
DB Cates
2024-04-07 17:14:12 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'? Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)

My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 08:40:52 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]

Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.

FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
DB Cates
2024-04-09 14:36:07 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?
Post by Martin Harran
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 15:24:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
Apparently not.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
DB Cates
2024-04-09 16:28:11 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
During the (present conditions determined) pause conditions change that
cause (determined) better decisions.
Post by Martin Harran
Apparently not.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
Are you becoming a better decision maker (non-deterministic) or are
different conditions determining better 'decisions'?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-10 09:09:54 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
During the (present conditions determined) pause conditions change that
cause (determined) better decisions.
Post by Martin Harran
Apparently not.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
Are you becoming a better decision maker (non-deterministic) or are
different conditions determining better 'decisions'?
What conditions affecting my decision-making have changed from when I
went to bed last night until I woke this morning?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
--
DB Cates
2024-04-10 15:19:45 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
During the (present conditions determined) pause conditions change that
cause (determined) better decisions.
Post by Martin Harran
Apparently not.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
a deterministic scenario?
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
Are you becoming a better decision maker (non-deterministic) or are
different conditions determining better 'decisions'?
What conditions affecting my decision-making have changed from when I
went to bed last night until I woke this morning?
Your brain does not stop doing things while you sleep. Your stomach is
empty, bladder and bowel full, glucose levels different. Lighting and
temperature are probably different. etc
All these affect how your brain is operating. >>
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws. That meets my
definition of supernatural. I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
Post by DB Cates
My wife passed no further remark
Post by Martin Harran
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
considered, logical decision. /s
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-11 07:42:18 UTC
Reply
Permalink
[snip for focus]
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Post by DB Cates
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural

As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset. In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief and, if you want
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
Post by DB Cates
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?

[…]
DB Cates
2024-04-12 02:32:18 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
[snip for focus]
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Non-random physical activity without the required energy supply.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
I'm happy with that definition as long as it is taken quite strictly, ie
"cannot be explained by science" and not 'is not presently completely
explicable by science'.
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)And there is no indication that it violates
any physical laws. so I would call it paranormal, not supernatural.

In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
Post by Martin Harran
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
I'm sure you do believe that, but then I believe you had no choice but
to do so, it's just who you are. I also believe that you are wrong.

and, if you want
Post by Martin Harran
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
That does not follow. I believe that I did not chose my belief, I
believe that I hold my belief because of who I am. where is the
supernatural in that?

BTW, I am a bit pissed off by part of your other earlier reply and will
not be responding to it. In future, I would appreciate it if, in
responding to my points, you refrained from comparing me to some other
arsehole on the web, I am arsehole enough on my own.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
[…]
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-12 11:56:07 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[snip for focus]
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Non-random physical activity without the required energy supply.
I see two problems with that statement. First of all, I'm not at all
sure what you mean by it; if my dualist consciousness makes me decide
to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that comes from my
body, not from my consciousness - perhaps you can give a specific of
what you mean.

Secondly, even if some unidentified energy supply is necessary, I
can't understand why you see that as a problem; 50 years ago we knew
nothing about the existence of dark energy, but now we know a lot
about it. Why do you rule out other forces or supplies of energy that
we don't know anything about?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
I'm happy with that definition as long as it is taken quite strictly, ie
"cannot be explained by science" and not 'is not presently completely
explicable by science'.
I have no problem with that provided the qualifier is not just an
attempt to create unjustified wriggle room. (See my comments below
about the lack of progress in neurological explanations).
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."

Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?

Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
Post by DB Cates
And there is no indication that it violates
any physical laws. so I would call it paranormal, not supernatural.
I've already given you the Cambridge definition of supernatural i.e
"caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science". The same dictionary defines
paranormal as "impossible to explain by known natural forces or by
science". Can you clarify what the significant difference is that
makes you prefer the latter?
Post by DB Cates
In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
Post by Martin Harran
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
I'm sure you do believe that, but then I believe you had no choice but
to do so, it's just who you are. I also believe that you are wrong.
and, if you want
Post by Martin Harran
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
That does not follow. I believe that I did not chose my belief, I
believe that I hold my belief because of who I am. where is the
supernatural in that?
Can you provide a scientific explanation for your belief?
Post by DB Cates
BTW, I am a bit pissed off by part of your other earlier reply and will
not be responding to it. In future, I would appreciate it if, in
responding to my points, you refrained from comparing me to some other
arsehole on the web, I am arsehole enough on my own.
Sorry, but that sounds like a cop-out. I wasn't comparing *you* to Ron
Dean, I was comparing your *line of reasoning* to his. Scientists are
just as prone to squeezing evidence to support their beliefs as
religious believers are and I have no hesitation in calling out either
case when I see it. I certainly don't regard you as an arsehole and
don't believe I have ever indicated that I might think so.

BTW, I don't regard Ron Dean as an arsehole either; he has some really
strange beliefs and ideas but that doesn't make him an arsehole in my
eyes.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
Nothing to offer on this?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[…]
--
DB Cates
2024-04-12 18:27:10 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[snip for focus]
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Non-random physical activity without the required energy supply.
I see two problems with that statement. First of all, I'm not at all
sure what you mean by it; if my dualist consciousness makes me decide
to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that comes from my
body, not from my consciousness - perhaps you can give a specific of
what you mean.
If you had said, in that statement just above, 'if my consciousness
makes me decide to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that
comes from my body, not from my consciousness' then we would be in
complete agreement. The "makes me" bit is consistent with determinism
and the electrochemical conditions and energy flows are consistent with
and sufficient for the changes associated with the decision being made.
IIUC, dualism posits the existence of an entity separate from but
intimately associated with the brain than can non-randomly channel the
brain's activity. This should require the application of some sort of
energy to the brain. Since there is neither evidence or necessity for
this in the observed brain activity I think it counts as supernatural.
Post by Martin Harran
Secondly, even if some unidentified energy supply is necessary, I
can't understand why you see that as a problem; 50 years ago we knew
nothing about the existence of dark energy, but now we know a lot
about it. Why do you rule out other forces or supplies of energy that
we don't know anything about?
My argument is not that it *is* necessary but that it is not observably
necessary but would have to exist under dualism. Dark energy is presumed
to exist because something like it is required to account for observed
conditions.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
I'm happy with that definition as long as it is taken quite strictly, ie
"cannot be explained by science" and not 'is not presently completely
explicable by science'.
I have no problem with that provided the qualifier is not just an
attempt to create unjustified wriggle room. (See my comments below
about the lack of progress in neurological explanations).
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Not that I am aware of, but there is no indication of any movement to
abandon the search as fruitless.
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
Post by DB Cates
And there is no indication that it violates
any physical laws. so I would call it paranormal, not supernatural.
I've already given you the Cambridge definition of supernatural i.e
"caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science". The same dictionary defines
paranormal as "impossible to explain by known natural forces or by
science". Can you clarify what the significant difference is that
makes you prefer the latter?
I screwed up badly there. I came across a description similar to my
beliefs and grabbed their terminology without vetting it (bias
acknowledged). I should have said unknown at present (perhaps
unknowable). 'Consciousness' is hard, is there a widely accepted
definition? I've seen everything from 'absolute proof that we are
transcendent beings' to 'named hallucination'. Both of those extremes
fall into the 'unknowable bin but for different reasons. There is lots
of evidence that the brain is intimately involved but I am unaware of
any evidence of any other involvement.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
Post by Martin Harran
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
I'm sure you do believe that, but then I believe you had no choice but
to do so, it's just who you are. I also believe that you are wrong.
and, if you want
Post by Martin Harran
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
That does not follow. I believe that I did not chose my belief, I
believe that I hold my belief because of who I am. where is the
supernatural in that?
Can you provide a scientific explanation for your belief?
It's a manifestation of the electrochemical conditions of my brain. Of
course the brain is far from perfect in these matters and may be lying
to me (and yours you) in spite of its best intentions (helping you
survive). Are you familiar with the 'white/gold' 'blue/black' picture of
a dress a few years ago? It turns out it is blue/black but the people
who saw white/gold completely wrong. Their brains were quite honestly
telling them an untruth. The brain's vision processing system is quite
clever and quite unconscious and does a lot of unconscious processing
before reporting its results to the rest of the brain. If you were a
morning, outdoorsy person, your brain *assumed*, lacking conflicting
information, that this was the most likely lighting and processed the
actual colours in the picture to reflect that. In this case it reported
blue/black (correctly). If you were a night, indoorsy person it made the
colour corrections and reported white/gold (incorrectly). Even being
told what the lighting conditions were did not alter that. Conscious
knowledge did not override what the vision system 'knew'. Shown the
actual dress they get it right. (I believe some of the white/gold group
deny that they were shown the actual dress).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
BTW, I am a bit pissed off by part of your other earlier reply and will
not be responding to it. In future, I would appreciate it if, in
responding to my points, you refrained from comparing me to some other
arsehole on the web, I am arsehole enough on my own.
Sorry, but that sounds like a cop-out. I wasn't comparing *you* to Ron
Dean, I was comparing your *line of reasoning* to his.
Hmm. That sounds like a cop-out. Go ahead, critique the line of
reasoning, I expect nothing less. But why even mention Ron Dean? one
might be tempted to think you were making an invidious comparison while
cloaking it in a veil of plausible deniability. You know, like _____
______ used to do.

Scientists are
Post by Martin Harran
just as prone to squeezing evidence to support their beliefs as
religious believers are and I have no hesitation in calling out either
case when I see it. I certainly don't regard you as an arsehole and
don't believe I have ever indicated that I might think so.
BTW, I don't regard Ron Dean as an arsehole either; he has some really
strange beliefs and ideas but that doesn't make him an arsehole in my
eyes.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
Nothing to offer on this?
re: my comments above. You seem quite happy to accept the (possible?)
existence of unnecessary and unevidenced goal directed energy affecting
brain processes.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[…]
--
--
--
Don Cates ("he's a cunning rascal" PN)
Martin Harran
2024-04-17 10:14:14 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[snip for focus]
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Hint? Is is supernatural
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
see just below
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Non-random physical activity without the required energy supply.
I see two problems with that statement. First of all, I'm not at all
sure what you mean by it; if my dualist consciousness makes me decide
to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that comes from my
body, not from my consciousness - perhaps you can give a specific of
what you mean.
If you had said, in that statement just above, 'if my consciousness
makes me decide to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that
comes from my body, not from my consciousness' then we would be in
complete agreement. The "makes me" bit is consistent with determinism
and the electrochemical conditions and energy flows are consistent with
and sufficient for the changes associated with the decision being made.
"Consistent with" on its own is not scientific evidence, you need to
show a direct relationship between the two. We have a pretty good
understanding of the brain activities that take place during
decision-making and other conscious activities but nobody has been
able to identify how those activities originate.
Post by DB Cates
IIUC, dualism posits the existence of an entity separate from but
intimately associated with the brain than can non-randomly channel the
brain's activity. This should require the application of some sort of
energy to the brain. Since there is neither evidence or necessity for
this in the observed brain activity I think it counts as supernatural.
You seem hung up on this need for an external energy source. Apart
from the fact that there may be a force that we have not yet
identified, there is no reason why dualist consciousness could not be
using the energy generated within the brain. I have a thermostat in my
living room controlling an electric heating system. The thermostat is
not an inherent part of the heating system but it draws its energy
from the same source in order to control it.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Secondly, even if some unidentified energy supply is necessary, I
can't understand why you see that as a problem; 50 years ago we knew
nothing about the existence of dark energy, but now we know a lot
about it. Why do you rule out other forces or supplies of energy that
we don't know anything about?
My argument is not that it *is* necessary but that it is not observably
necessary but would have to exist under dualism. Dark energy is presumed
to exist because something like it is required to account for observed
conditions.
It wasn't presumed to exist 50 years ago. When first put forward by
Guth and Starobinsky in 1980, it was pure conjecture, it wasn't until
nearly twenty years later that the first direct supporting evidence
was found.
.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
I'm happy with that definition as long as it is taken quite strictly, ie
"cannot be explained by science" and not 'is not presently completely
explicable by science'.
I have no problem with that provided the qualifier is not just an
attempt to create unjustified wriggle room. (See my comments below
about the lack of progress in neurological explanations).
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Not that I am aware of, but there is no indication of any movement to
abandon the search as fruitless.
I'm not suggesting that the search should be abandoned as fruitless.
What I do think is that there should be a recognition (which does seem
to be happening, albeit very slowly) that the current emphasis on a
neurologic solution is not delivering answers and that alternative
approaches should be considered. Perhaps we need a modern-day
Copernicus to say - "Let's turn this around; instead of brain
processes forming "the mind", could "the mind" be forming the brain
processes?" I use quotes around "the mind" because althogh we both
know what I mean, there is no clear definition of it but that itself
might at least in part be because of limitations in our current
thinking and approaches, perhaps a new approach would allow us to come
up with a clearer definition.

I also think that we really need to abandon the idea that
consciousness is purely part of the brain. Recent research has shown
that when gut microbes are transferred between rats, mental states and
behaviour are also transferred from host to recipient, no brain
transplant involved. I have also long felt that no satisfactory
attempt has been really made to explain how we experience different
emotions in different parts of our body - grief in our heart,
nervousness in our stomach, fear in our bowels. The standard approach
seems to be to handwave these away as the brain sending messages to
those organs but no explanation is offered as to why it works that
way.

We should also be looking at other life forms - jellyfish have no
brain yet seem to be able to sense and respond to stimuli and even
have some learning capability. Other research has suggested that even
plants may have a rudimentary form of consciousness with ability to
transfer information between plants.

Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.

I think an underlying problem is that science generally is focused on
a materialistic solution, a convincement that the answer to
everything, including consciousness, must have a materialist origin. I
get the impression that this is accentuated by a phobia about not
opening the door to anything that might even hint of the supernatural,
especially God.

We need to recognise that there is no scientific evidence to confirm
either materialism or dualism as the explanation for consciousness. A
materialist approach to science has produced many wonderful results in
the way we have come to understand so much about nature and the
universe and should quite rightly be our initial approach for
attempting to solve unknown questions but it should not lead to closed
minds; if it fails to deliver results, we should be prepared to at
least consider other options whether or not they fit into a
materialist way of thinking.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
Post by DB Cates
And there is no indication that it violates
any physical laws. so I would call it paranormal, not supernatural.
I've already given you the Cambridge definition of supernatural i.e
"caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science". The same dictionary defines
paranormal as "impossible to explain by known natural forces or by
science". Can you clarify what the significant difference is that
makes you prefer the latter?
I screwed up badly there. I came across a description similar to my
beliefs and grabbed their terminology without vetting it (bias
acknowledged). I should have said unknown at present (perhaps
unknowable). 'Consciousness' is hard, is there a widely accepted
definition? I've seen everything from 'absolute proof that we are
transcendent beings' to 'named hallucination'. Both of those extremes
fall into the 'unknowable bin but for different reasons. There is lots
of evidence that the brain is intimately involved but I am unaware of
any evidence of any other involvement.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
Post by Martin Harran
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
I'm sure you do believe that, but then I believe you had no choice but
to do so, it's just who you are. I also believe that you are wrong.
and, if you want
Post by Martin Harran
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
That does not follow. I believe that I did not chose my belief, I
believe that I hold my belief because of who I am. where is the
supernatural in that?
Can you provide a scientific explanation for your belief?
It's a manifestation of the electrochemical conditions of my brain. Of
course the brain is far from perfect in these matters and may be lying
to me (and yours you) in spite of its best intentions (helping you
survive). Are you familiar with the 'white/gold' 'blue/black' picture of
a dress a few years ago? It turns out it is blue/black but the people
who saw white/gold completely wrong. Their brains were quite honestly
telling them an untruth. The brain's vision processing system is quite
clever and quite unconscious and does a lot of unconscious processing
before reporting its results to the rest of the brain. If you were a
morning, outdoorsy person, your brain *assumed*, lacking conflicting
information, that this was the most likely lighting and processed the
actual colours in the picture to reflect that. In this case it reported
blue/black (correctly). If you were a night, indoorsy person it made the
colour corrections and reported white/gold (incorrectly). Even being
told what the lighting conditions were did not alter that. Conscious
knowledge did not override what the vision system 'knew'. Shown the
actual dress they get it right. (I believe some of the white/gold group
deny that they were shown the actual dress).
That leads into another topic that fascinates me - illusion - but
let's leave that for another day. In regard to the above example, I'd
just repeat the analogy I gave before. I'm typing my ideas on a PC. If
something goes wrong with my keyboard, some of the letters I type and
the letters that appear on screen may be different. That doesn't,
however, mean that my keyboard is responsible for the generation of
the ideas I have. In the same way, the brain carries out a vast
multitude of complex activities and it is no surprise that there may
be some variation in outcome between brains in different people even
if they get the same inputs. I didn't really see it as an argument in
favour of either materialism or dualism.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
BTW, I am a bit pissed off by part of your other earlier reply and will
not be responding to it. In future, I would appreciate it if, in
responding to my points, you refrained from comparing me to some other
arsehole on the web, I am arsehole enough on my own.
Sorry, but that sounds like a cop-out. I wasn't comparing *you* to Ron
Dean, I was comparing your *line of reasoning* to his.
Hmm. That sounds like a cop-out. Go ahead, critique the line of
reasoning, I expect nothing less.
You seemed to be stretching things beyond breaking point to support
your argument. I know you walked away from that post in disgust but I
think my original point is important. I said that as I understood it,
you seemed to be saying that determinism doesn't only make my decision
in advance, by pre-determining the changes in conditions that will
affect me making the decision, it effectively determines the processes
that I will go through to reach it, even determining that I will spend
the night tossing and turning about the decision. I thought your
argument is starting to sound more and more like someone who is
convinced of a particular answer and will either ignore or endlessly
manipulate contrary indicators to squeeze in the answer. Considering
it further since, to say that determinism is the result of the
conditions that exist but that determinism also created those
conditions is a circular argument, much like the 'begging the
question' fallacy that Ron Dean rightly criticised for.
Post by DB Cates
But why even mention Ron Dean?
Mainly because he is the only IDer currently using that sort of
process in TO and is generating a massive amount of activity but also
because rather than viewing you as in any way, like him, I see you as
the polar opposite of him in terms of rational thinking. It struck me
that he is on the opposite end of the spectrum from both of us yet I
saw similarities in the methodology *in this particular instance*. In
retrospect, I would probably have been better to refer to ID
proponents in general rather than a named individual.
Post by DB Cates
one
might be tempted to think you were making an invidious comparison while
cloaking it in a veil of plausible deniability. You know, like _____
______ used to do.
Scientists are
Post by Martin Harran
just as prone to squeezing evidence to support their beliefs as
religious believers are and I have no hesitation in calling out either
case when I see it. I certainly don't regard you as an arsehole and
don't believe I have ever indicated that I might think so.
BTW, I don't regard Ron Dean as an arsehole either; he has some really
strange beliefs and ideas but that doesn't make him an arsehole in my
eyes.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
Nothing to offer on this?
re: my comments above. You seem quite happy to accept the (possible?)
existence of unnecessary and unevidenced goal directed energy affecting
brain processes.
I'm not sure why you feel the need to put the question mark on
'possible'. I have never promoted dualism or any other
non-materialistic solution as a *definitive* answer, just that dualism
seems to me a better explanation for what we know at this point in
time. If convincing evidence is produced to support a materialist
explanation for consciousness, I will quite happily accept it, just as
I have accepted all other conclusive findings of science. It beats me
how you see that as "leeway". Right now, there is no such convincing
evidence for either materialism or dualism and I think that outright
dismissal of *either* is the real reflection of a closed mind.
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
[…]
--
--
Arkalen
2024-04-19 12:08:58 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:

snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
]

But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/

Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-20 12:42:49 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
Seems your thread about the book has fallen silent.
Arkalen
2024-04-20 17:46:29 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
Seems your thread about the book has fallen silent.
Threads do that :) But I've read and very much appreciated your replies.
I might have some question about what you said about the limbic system;
I tried looking up what you said about LeDoux debunking it but I
couldn't find something specific enough to hold my interest right at the
time I was looking into it (I have fifty thousand tabs open on alkaline
hydrothermal vents as it is and that's a bit more what I've been reading
these past weeks).

I hope you continue posting your thoughts as you go through the book, or
after you've finished.
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-21 05:28:33 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
Seems your thread about the book has fallen silent.
Threads do that :) But I've read and very much appreciated your replies.
I might have some question about what you said about the limbic system;
I tried looking up what you said about LeDoux debunking it but I
couldn't find something specific enough to hold my interest right at the
time I was looking into it (I have fifty thousand tabs open on alkaline
hydrothermal vents as it is and that's a bit more what I've been reading
these past weeks).
I hope you continue posting your thoughts as you go through the book, or
after you've finished.
LeDoux lays into the limbic myth at around 42:20 here:

Martin Harran
2024-04-22 08:52:51 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.

From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2024-04-22 09:39:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/


I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
--
Athel -- French and British, living in Marseilles for 37 years; mainly
in England until 1987.
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 10:36:02 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html

I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2024-04-22 13:04:07 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
--
Athel cb
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 13:33:28 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:

https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172

<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man — which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic — in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (“tipsy prose-poetry”), some
technical shortcomings (“no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory”), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (“obscure pious rant”) and so duping a gullible public
(“educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought”). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
Athel Cornish-Bowden
2024-04-22 18:45:46 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I tried with a different browser that was less fussy. That worked OK. I
agree with you that its more an attack on Teilhard's style than on his
science.

The "tipsy, euphoristic prose-poetry which is one of the more tiresome
manifestations of the French spirit" has largely gone out of fashion in
today's France: certainly I don't recognize it in the work of any
French scientists that I know. Maybe some philosophers still use it --
I haven't read any of Derrida's musings for a long time, and I don't
feel inclined to try again with him. We see a lot more on television
than I would like of the world's greatest philosopher, Bernard-Henri
Lévy. I think he's a poseur among poseurs. I'm not keen on Régis Debray
either: I doubt whether many people would have heard of him if he
hadn't been imprisoned in Bolivia.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
Thanks for that reference. It's interesting, but I need to think more about it.

I was surprised by this passage:

"A good deal of hostility has been directed at the concept of the
biosphere as an intelligent organism — James Lovelock's Gaia — and at
astronomer Fred Hoyle's ideas on the extraterrestrial origin of life.
Both met with popular enthusiasm before the scientific establishment
would admit that they were candidate hypotheses."

When were either of these accepted as "candidate hypotheses"? By whom?
Post by Martin Harran
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man — which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic — in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (“tipsy prose-poetry”), some
technical shortcomings (“no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory”), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (“obscure pious rant”) and so duping a gullible public
(“educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought”). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
--
Athel cb
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-23 12:47:39 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man — which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic — in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (“tipsy prose-poetry”), some
technical shortcomings (“no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory”), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (“obscure pious rant”) and so duping a gullible public
(“educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought”). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard. The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.

Perhaps forest floor internetworking between trees and mycorrhizae are a
sorta convergence to the grade of thinking layer. I dunno.

If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away
opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take. There are so many
points where evolutionary outcomes could have differed. That we are here
seems meaningful to us, but not to the universe, even if Teilhard and his
pal Julian Huxley thought the universe becoming self-aware through us was a
profound thought. According to Mayr, Huxley thought humans deserved the
grade (or Kingdom) of Psychozoa which seems somewhat conceited.
Martin Harran
2024-04-25 08:42:50 UTC
Reply
Permalink
rOn Tue, 23 Apr 2024 12:47:39 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
(?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard.
Why do you think an *antidote* is needed, in what way do you regard
Teilhard's ideas as poisonous?

In regard to Gould himself, assuming you are talking about NOMA, I
don't think he was particularly effective. First of all, I think he
was trying to eliminate conflict that didn't need to be eliminated. Up
until the end of the 19th-century, science and religious belief didn't
just live alongside each other, they were closely intertwined with a
lot of scientific progress being driven by the search for improved
religious belief. I think Gould was reacting to the growth in
fundamentalism, particularly in the USA, but even there I think it was
never mainstream belief and, in any event, the fundamentalists were
never going to listen to Gould. There is of course the other side of
the coin with the arrival of New Atheism and the particular prominence
of 'the four horsemen' but that really came after Gould and again,
like all militants, they too were not going to pay any attention to
what Gould was saying. One of the things I have always detested about
Dawkins is the way he tried after Gould's death to make out without
any evidence that Gould was probably only pretending to be tolerant of
religious belief in order to protect his funding.

Secondly, I think he was doing a disservice to the growth in human
knowledge by trying to completely separate religion and science. There
are very few aspects of life that are rigidly in one area without
overlapping other areas and it is often in that overlapping that we
can find fresh answers for both areas. In trying to understand
anything better, I believe that we get a fuller understanding by
drawing information from a range of different areas; in the case of
understanding human development, I think we should be drawing from
science, philosophy, theology, psychology, and other 'soft' sciences
rather than just relying on 'pure' science with its own limitations.


That is one of the things I like about Teilhard; whether or not his
ideas are correct, he has shown that it is possible to draw from both
science and theology without sacrificing anything from either.
Post by *Hemidactylus*
The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.
Perhaps forest floor internetworking between trees and mycorrhizae are a
sorta convergence to the grade of thinking layer. I dunno.
If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away
opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take. There are so many
points where evolutionary outcomes could have differed. That we are here
seems meaningful to us, but not to the universe, even if Teilhard and his
pal Julian Huxley thought the universe becoming self-aware through us was a
profound thought. According to Mayr, Huxley thought humans deserved the
grade (or Kingdom) of Psychozoa which seems somewhat conceited.
I'm working my way through Tomasello's 'The Evolution of Agency' at
the moment. I don't want to say much until I have finished it but this
sentence in the introduction really caught my attention:

"Attending to an extended evolutionary history before the emergence of
modern humans creates a view of human psychology as a kind of layered
onion, with an inner core of basic processes shared by all agentive
organisms, further layers that humans share only with other mammals or
primates, and an outermost layer of uniquely human psychology in all
its dizzying complexity."

I find that recognition of human uniqueness refreshing. It is tiresome
when people dismiss the basic idea of such uniqueness, claiming that
there really is no great difference between a crow using a stick to
get food out of a bottle and me using the computer that I'm using the
moment or that the incredibly complex world developed by humans that I
can see all around me isn't really much different from an ants nest.

There are numerous features and capabilities where the difference
between humans and other animals is completely off the scale plus
human capabilitiesthat don't even exist in other animals. Can you
identify any other species that is, for example, capable of developing
the concept of God whether that concept is based on something real or
something that is totally imaginary? Playing down these differences
harms rather than benefits us in trying to get a better understanding
of what it means to be human and how we got there.
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-26 10:22:05 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Tue, 23 Apr 2024 12:47:39 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
(?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard.
Why do you think an *antidote* is needed, in what way do you regard
Teilhard's ideas as poisonous?
As a counter to Teilhard’s progressivism.
Post by Martin Harran
In regard to Gould himself, assuming you are talking about NOMA, I
don't think he was particularly effective.
Post by *Hemidactylus*
The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.
And elsethread:
“Given the omega point boils down to a path towards Christ (Christogenesis)
I don’t know that one can address that from a scientific perspective. From
a more abstracted remove his evolutionary perspective was a form of
orthogenesis, which isn’t taken very seriously. I think Gould indirectly
buries it in Full House (the random walk and Modal Bacter aspects) and
Wonderful Life (contingency).”
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-26 10:30:56 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Martin Harran
rOn Tue, 23 Apr 2024 12:47:39 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
(?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
As I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard.
Why do you think an *antidote* is needed, in what way do you regard
Teilhard's ideas as poisonous?
As a counter to Teilhard’s progressivism.
Post by Martin Harran
In regard to Gould himself, assuming you are talking about NOMA, I
don't think he was particularly effective.
Post by *Hemidactylus*
The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle.
Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are
the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.
“Given the omega point boils down to a path towards Christ (Christogenesis)
I don’t know that one can address that from a scientific perspective. From
a more abstracted remove his evolutionary perspective was a form of
orthogenesis, which isn’t taken very seriously. I think Gould indirectly
buries it in Full House (the random walk and Modal Bacter aspects) and
Wonderful Life (contingency).”
Oh and also in my post you replied to:
“If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away
opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take.”
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 14:33:37 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
The reason your computer didn't like the link is probably that it goes
to a HTTP site (no digital certificate) and browsers have got very
picky about that. I have converted the web page to a PDF and uploaded
it here, perhaps your browser will be less apprehensive about that.

https://teilhard-medawar.tiiny.site/

The reason that I have gone to that trouble is that I'm genuinely
interested in hearing your comments on it. Before accepting ideas that
seem attractive, I always like to check contradictory views. I have
been looking for some time for a scientific response to Teilhard but
have never been able to find one; when I have asked, I have invariably
been referred to Medawar's piece which, for the reasons already given,
I have always found unsatisfying.

I'm particularly curious to se your reaction to Medawar's' statement
that "French is not a language that lends itself naturally to the
opaque and ponderous idiom of nature-philosophy, and Teilhard has
according resorted to the use of that tipsy, euphoristic prose-poetry
which is one of the more tiresome manifestations of the French spirit"
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-22 19:23:04 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Athel Cornish-Bowden
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
http://youtu.be/47WXVTpnOyU ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
Post by Martin Harran
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
The reason your computer didn't like the link is probably that it goes
to a HTTP site (no digital certificate) and browsers have got very
picky about that. I have converted the web page to a PDF and uploaded
it here, perhaps your browser will be less apprehensive about that.
https://teilhard-medawar.tiiny.site/
The reason that I have gone to that trouble is that I'm genuinely
interested in hearing your comments on it. Before accepting ideas that
seem attractive, I always like to check contradictory views. I have
been looking for some time for a scientific response to Teilhard but
have never been able to find one; when I have asked, I have invariably
been referred to Medawar's piece which, for the reasons already given,
I have always found unsatisfying.
Given the omega point boils down to a path towards Christ (Christogenesis)
I don’t know that one can address that from a scientific perspective. From
a more abstracted remove his evolutionary perspective was a form of
orthogenesis, which isn’t taken very seriously. I think Gould indirectly
buries it in Full House (the random walk and Modal Bacter aspects) and
Wonderful Life (contingency).
Post by Martin Harran
I'm particularly curious to se your reaction to Medawar's' statement
that "French is not a language that lends itself naturally to the
opaque and ponderous idiom of nature-philosophy, and Teilhard has
according resorted to the use of that tipsy, euphoristic prose-poetry
which is one of the more tiresome manifestations of the French spirit"
I’m less put off by the post-structuralists like Baudrillard and
Situationists like Debord than others may be. Though Swiss Piaget was
Francophone and not too flighty. Luc Montagnier was a well known virologist
and did toy with homeopathy a bit.
Arkalen
2024-04-13 12:41:16 UTC
Reply
Permalink
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"? And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.

The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
also continued bearing fruit. Antonio Damasio for example who wrote
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.

The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.

Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).


Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.


I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.

snip
Martin Harran
2024-04-17 11:54:41 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Post by Arkalen
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,

"Big data is not knowledge …

… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
Post by Arkalen
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain. It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)

I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
Post by Arkalen
snip
Arkalen
2024-04-17 13:37:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.

But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.

If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.

Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
It's true the big data is not knowledge, and it's also definitely true
that advances in scanning technology have been a mixed bag, with fMRI in
particular resulting in a lot of junk science. It doesn't mean it's all
junk however or that advances haven't been made. Anil Seth's book in
particular is definitely discussing advances in our understanding, not
raw data or junk fMRI entrail-reading (if he was careful enough at
least, which he comes across as being).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
I haven't read it either but I probably should, "system 1/system 2" puts
names to ideas I'd cobbled together myself from various sources but
didn't know had a name. I've been starting to use those terms but should
probably check what he actually uses them to say before I go too far
with that.

I'd definitely recommend Anil Seth's "Being You" for you though. He also
has talks on youtube, I could find one to link if you like.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
Neural networks are decades old, they're not the kind of contribution
from human & animal cognition I was thinking of. In fact to my
understanding people working in AI aren't really keeping up to date with
research into neurons themselves either, figuring that the kind of
neuron behavior they already implement is sufficient to the processing
they're trying to do and/or that adding complexity at that level will
harm rather than help. I don't have an opinion as to whether they're
right or wrong on that, like I said it's not the contribution I had in
mind. But I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the contributions of
neural science currently used in computer neural networks were pretty
much all contributed in the previous millennium.
Post by Martin Harran
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
You definitely want to read Alison Gopnik then, her work is very much
informed by AI research and it is clearly a field she keeps up to date
with and collaborates with researchers from.
Post by Martin Harran
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
I agree, and last I checked I'd gotten the impression that they were,
and doing so more seriously than the other way around. But I can't say
I've done a thorough survey either and I could be influenced by the fact
I follow Alison Gopnik so I could be improperly generalizing from her
work and that of people in her circles.
Martin Harran
2024-04-18 07:45:53 UTC
Reply
Permalink
I'll reply to your post later but this article just popped up on my
newsfeed and I thought you might find it interesting. It's paywalled
so I've copied the full article below in case you don't have access -
sorry, I haven't time to edit it.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/17/science/colorado-brain-data-privacy.html

Your Brain Waves Are Up for Sale. A New Law Wants to Change That.

In a first, a Colorado law extends privacy rights to the neural data
increasingly coveted by technology companies.

Share full article
A young man makes a small, spherical helicopter levitate above a
trade-show table using a device on his forehead that reads his brain
waves. Several people watch.
Siddharth Hariharoan tries to control a toy helicopter with his mind
through the MindWave Mobile, a device by NeuroSky that reads brain
waves. Credit... Winni Wintermeyer for The New York Times
By Jonathan Moens

April 17, 2024
Consumers have grown accustomed to the prospect that their personal
data, such as email addresses, social contacts, browsing history and
genetic ancestry, are being collected and often resold by the apps and
the digital services they use.

With the advent of consumer neurotechnologies, the data being
collected is becoming ever more intimate. One headband serves as a
personal meditation coach by monitoring the user’s brain activity.
Another purports to help treat anxiety and symptoms of depression.
Another reads and interprets brain signals while the user scrolls
through dating apps, presumably to provide better matches. (“‘Listen
to your heart’ is not enough,” the manufacturer says on its website.)

The companies behind such technologies have access to the records of
the users’ brain activity — the electrical signals underlying our
thoughts, feelings and intentions.

On Wednesday, Governor Jared Polis of Colorado signed a bill that, for
the first time in the United States, tries to ensure that such data
remains truly private. The new law, which passed by a 61-to-1 vote in
the Colorado House and a 34-to-0 vote in the Senate, expands the
definition of “sensitive data” in the state’s current personal privacy
law to include biological and “neural data” generated by the brain,
the spinal cord and the network of nerves that relays messages
throughout the body.

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“Everything that we are is within our mind,” said Jared Genser,
general counsel and co-founder of the Neurorights Foundation, a
science group that advocated the bill’s passage. “What we think and
feel, and the ability to decode that from the human brain, couldn’t be
any more intrusive or personal to us.”

“We are really excited to have an actual bill signed into law that
will protect people’s biological and neurological data,” said
Representative Cathy Kipp, Democrat of Colorado, who introduced the
bill.

Senator Mark Baisley, Republican of Colorado, who sponsored the bill
in the upper chamber, said: “I’m feeling really good about Colorado
leading the way in addressing this and to give it the due protections
for people’s uniqueness in their privacy. I’m just really pleased
about this signing.”

The law takes aim at consumer-level brain technologies. Unlike
sensitive patient data obtained from medical devices in clinical
settings, which are protected by federal health law, the data
surrounding consumer neurotechnologies go largely unregulated, Mr.
Genser said. That loophole means that companies can harvest vast
troves of highly sensitive brain data, sometimes for an unspecified
number of years, and share or sell the information to third parties.

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“We’ve never seen anything with this power before — to identify,
codify people and bias against people based on their brain waves and
other neural information,” said Sean Pauzauskie, a member of the board
of directors of the Colorado Medical Society, who first brought the
issue to Ms. Kipp’s attention. Mr. Pauzauskie was recently hired by
the Neurorights Foundation as medical director.

The new law extends to biological and neural data the same protections
granted under the Colorado Privacy Act to fingerprints, facial images
and other sensitive, biometric data.

Among other protections, consumers have the right to access, delete
and correct their data, as well as to opt out of the sale or use of
the data for targeted advertising. Companies, in turn, face strict
regulations regarding how they handle such data and must disclose the
kinds of data they collect and their plans for it.

“Individuals ought to be able to control where that information — that
personally identifiable and maybe even personally predictive
information — goes,” Mr. Baisley said.

Advertisement

Experts say that the neurotechnology industry is poised to expand as
major tech companies like Meta, Apple and Snapchat become involved.

“It’s moving quickly, but it’s about to grow exponentially,” said Nita
Farahany, a professor of law and philosophy at Duke.

From 2019 to 2020, investments in neurotechnology companies rose about
60 percent globally, and in 2021 they amounted to about $30 billion,
according to one market analysis. The industry drew attention in
January, when Elon Musk announced on X that a brain-computer interface
manufactured by Neuralink, one of his companies, had been implanted in
a person for the first time. Mr. Musk has since said that the patient
had made a full recovery and was now able to control a mouse solely
with his thoughts and play online chess.

While eerily dystopian, some brain technologies have led to
breakthrough treatments. In 2022, a completely paralyzed man was able
to communicate using a computer simply by imagining his eyes moving.
And last year, scientists were able to translate the brain activity of
a paralyzed woman and convey her speech and facial expressions through
an avatar on a computer screen.

“The things that people can do with this technology are great,” Ms.
Kipp said. “But we just think that there should be some guardrails in
place for people who aren’t intending to have their thoughts read and
their biological data used.”

Advertisement

That is already happening, according to a 100-page report published on
Wednesday by the Neurorights Foundation. The report analyzed 30
consumer neurotechnology companies to see how their privacy policies
and user agreements squared with international privacy standards. It
found that only one company restricted access to a person’s neural
data in a meaningful way and that almost two-thirds could, under
certain circumstances, share data with third parties. Two companies
implied that they already sold such data.

“The need to protect neural data is not a tomorrow problem — it’s a
today problem,” said Mr. Genser, who was among the authors of the
report.

The new Colorado bill won resounding bipartisan support, but it faced
fierce external opposition, Mr. Baisley said, especially from private
universities.

Representative Cathy Kipp, Democrat of Colorado, wearing a mask and a
black blazer, talks to a woman while standing among the seats of the
State Capitol in Denver.
Representative Cathy Kipp, Democrat of Colorado, center, introduced
the new bill. Credit... David Zalubowski/Associated Press
Testifying before a Senate committee, John Seward, research compliance
officer at the University of Denver, a private research university,
noted that public universities were exempt from the Colorado Privacy
Act of 2021. The new law puts private institutions at a disadvantage,
Mr. Seward testified, because they will be limited in their ability to
train students who are using “the tools of the trade in neural
diagnostics and research” purely for research and teaching purposes.

Advertisement

“The playing field is not equal,” Mr. Seward testified.

The Colorado bill is the first of its kind to be signed into law in
the United States, but Minnesota and California are pushing for
similar legislation. On Tuesday, California’s Senate Judiciary
Committee unanimously passed a bill that defines neural data as
“sensitive personal information.” Several countries, including Chile,
Brazil, Spain, Mexico and Uruguay, have either already enshrined
protections on brain-related data in their state-level or national
constitutions or taken steps toward doing so.

“In the long run,” Mr. Genser said, “we would like to see global
standards developed,” for instance by extending existing international
human rights treaties to protect neural data.

In the United States, proponents of the new Colorado law hope it will
establish a precedent for other states and even create momentum for
federal legislation. But the law has limitations, experts noted, and
might apply only to consumer neurotechnology companies that are
gathering neural data specifically to determine a person’s identity,
as the new law specifies. Most of these companies collect neural data
for other reasons, such as for inferring what a person might be
thinking or feeling, Ms. Farahany said.

“You’re not going to worry about this Colorado bill if you’re any of
those companies right now, because none of them are using them for
identification purposes,” she added.

But Mr. Genser said that the Colorado Privacy Act law protects any
data that qualifies as personal. Given that consumers must supply
their names in order to purchase a product and agree to company
privacy policies, this use falls under personal data, he said.

Advertisement
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 08:23:29 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
Post by Arkalen
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
having nothing to offer regarding answers:

"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."

Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
It's true the big data is not knowledge, and it's also definitely true
that advances in scanning technology have been a mixed bag, with fMRI in
particular resulting in a lot of junk science. It doesn't mean it's all
junk however or that advances haven't been made. Anil Seth's book in
particular is definitely discussing advances in our understanding, not
raw data or junk fMRI entrail-reading (if he was careful enough at
least, which he comes across as being).
Cobb certainly does not dismiss the wealth of data as junk, he thinks
the problem is that no *framework* has been found within which sense
can be made of the data. He also thinks we are trying too hard to look
at the big picture, he is particularly disparaging about the Human
Brain Project wich ran for 10 years with £1 billion in funding from
the EU and produced nothing of value. His own solution is to start
small and gradually build up knowledge:

"My own preference for how best to proceed in understanding the brain
would be to pour resources into discrete, doable projects able to
provide insight that can subsequently be integrated into a more global
approach. Crick's approach to studying consciousness applies to the
brain as a whole, it seems to me. As some parts of theoretical physics
demonstrate, high-flying ideas that are not rooted in experimental
reality can generate vast amounts of excitement and occupy whole
academic careers, without necessarily advancing understanding. By
developing analytical techniques and theoretical frameworks to
understand what a fly thinks, we will lay the ground for understanding
more complex brains; trying to understand simple animal brains will
keep us busy for the rest of the century, at least. If you feel that
any study of the brain must involve a vertebrate to be truly
interesting, the brain of the tiny zebrafish larva consists of only
100,000 neurons, and easily falls into the small-brain category."
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
I haven't read it either but I probably should, "system 1/system 2" puts
names to ideas I'd cobbled together myself from various sources but
didn't know had a name. I've been starting to use those terms but should
probably check what he actually uses them to say before I go too far
with that.
I'd definitely recommend Anil Seth's "Being You" for you though. He also
has talks on youtube, I could find one to link if you like.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
Neural networks are decades old, they're not the kind of contribution
from human & animal cognition I was thinking of. In fact to my
understanding people working in AI aren't really keeping up to date with
research into neurons themselves either, figuring that the kind of
neuron behavior they already implement is sufficient to the processing
they're trying to do and/or that adding complexity at that level will
harm rather than help. I don't have an opinion as to whether they're
right or wrong on that, like I said it's not the contribution I had in
mind. But I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the contributions of
neural science currently used in computer neural networks were pretty
much all contributed in the previous millennium.
Post by Martin Harran
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
You definitely want to read Alison Gopnik then, her work is very much
informed by AI research and it is clearly a field she keeps up to date
with and collaborates with researchers from.
I will get around to reading some of her stuff but my reading list is
lengthening by the day as inevitably happens when I get involved in
this type of discussion <smile>. I note she is a
psychologist/philosopher, not a neurologist. I don't have an issue
with that, as I've said previously, I think we will only ever get to
understand the brain and consciousness by drawing from a wide range of
areas. I only mention it because I think there is still overwhelming
reliance on neurology to provide the answers.
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
I agree, and last I checked I'd gotten the impression that they were,
and doing so more seriously than the other way around. But I can't say
I've done a thorough survey either and I could be influenced by the fact
I follow Alison Gopnik so I could be improperly generalizing from her
work and that of people in her circles.
Arkalen
2024-04-23 05:58:55 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies. Science isn't about mindlessly looking at things,
science is about building models, theories - and validating them by
figuring out if they have any consequence on what anything might look
and looking there. The theory is more fundamental than the observations
and it can get away with even the most glancing relationship to the
"visible". The issue with dualism isn't that it's non-visible, it's that
it has no explanatory power and the main reason it has no explanatory
power is that it behaves like a false idea in response to evidence (for
example act like it's irrelevant when brain activity turns out to
totally correlate with every distinct aspect of the mind one can find).
In other words there is "being non-visible" and then there's "actively
shunning visibility", and dualism does the latter. This is a tradeoff of
risk of disconfirmation for lack of content, and it's lack of content
that's the real problem for science.


Multiverse ideas that science entertains (which is obviously not all of
them) are straightforward deductions from models that have been
otherwise validated by their interactions with visible things, and the
scientists entertaining them would love nothing more than to work out
consequences of these models that would result in a
yet-unobserved-but-visible difference compared to other models. Because
until they do, being "entertained" by science is the best those ideas
can hope for.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
referring to some bar for "understanding" or "answer" that hasn't been
met and not saying there's been no change at all, or maybe he's
referring to some specific over-optimistic predictions made by that 1953
magazine. Or maybe he's indeed saying something I disagree with, idk.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
I read "The man who mistook his wife for a hat" and "Musicophilia"; the
former is as fun as the title suggests but I'm guessing your reading
list is quite full already :) Like I said, I was mentioning him as an
example of work into how our mind can be broken down into different
processes that are sometimes surprisingly separable (like speaking and
understanding) or surprisingly linked (like emotion and decision-making).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
It's true the big data is not knowledge, and it's also definitely true
that advances in scanning technology have been a mixed bag, with fMRI in
particular resulting in a lot of junk science. It doesn't mean it's all
junk however or that advances haven't been made. Anil Seth's book in
particular is definitely discussing advances in our understanding, not
raw data or junk fMRI entrail-reading (if he was careful enough at
least, which he comes across as being).
Cobb certainly does not dismiss the wealth of data as junk, he thinks
the problem is that no *framework* has been found within which sense
can be made of the data. He also thinks we are trying too hard to look
at the big picture, he is particularly disparaging about the Human
Brain Project wich ran for 10 years with £1 billion in funding from
the EU and produced nothing of value. His own solution is to start
"My own preference for how best to proceed in understanding the brain
would be to pour resources into discrete, doable projects able to
provide insight that can subsequently be integrated into a more global
approach. Crick's approach to studying consciousness applies to the
brain as a whole, it seems to me. As some parts of theoretical physics
demonstrate, high-flying ideas that are not rooted in experimental
reality can generate vast amounts of excitement and occupy whole
academic careers, without necessarily advancing understanding. By
developing analytical techniques and theoretical frameworks to
understand what a fly thinks, we will lay the ground for understanding
more complex brains; trying to understand simple animal brains will
keep us busy for the rest of the century, at least. If you feel that
any study of the brain must involve a vertebrate to be truly
interesting, the brain of the tiny zebrafish larva consists of only
100,000 neurons, and easily falls into the small-brain category."
Again I'm not sure what he means by a lack of "framework" or "discrete,
doable projects". There are plenty of people investigating the brain and
consciousness from all kinds of angles and most of them are "concrete,
doable projects". I think Anil Seth's "Being You" describes such
frameworks and projects for example. He's either referring to something
specific that I'm not getting from context, or I just disagree with him.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
I haven't read it either but I probably should, "system 1/system 2" puts
names to ideas I'd cobbled together myself from various sources but
didn't know had a name. I've been starting to use those terms but should
probably check what he actually uses them to say before I go too far
with that.
I'd definitely recommend Anil Seth's "Being You" for you though. He also
has talks on youtube, I could find one to link if you like.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
Neural networks are decades old, they're not the kind of contribution
from human & animal cognition I was thinking of. In fact to my
understanding people working in AI aren't really keeping up to date with
research into neurons themselves either, figuring that the kind of
neuron behavior they already implement is sufficient to the processing
they're trying to do and/or that adding complexity at that level will
harm rather than help. I don't have an opinion as to whether they're
right or wrong on that, like I said it's not the contribution I had in
mind. But I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the contributions of
neural science currently used in computer neural networks were pretty
much all contributed in the previous millennium.
Post by Martin Harran
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
You definitely want to read Alison Gopnik then, her work is very much
informed by AI research and it is clearly a field she keeps up to date
with and collaborates with researchers from.
I will get around to reading some of her stuff but my reading list is
lengthening by the day as inevitably happens when I get involved in
this type of discussion <smile>. I note she is a
psychologist/philosopher, not a neurologist. I don't have an issue
with that, as I've said previously, I think we will only ever get to
understand the brain and consciousness by drawing from a wide range of
areas. I only mention it because I think there is still overwhelming
reliance on neurology to provide the answers.
"Is there" really overwhelming reliance on neurology to provide the
answers or is it you who expect neurology to provide them and are
therefore only looking there and not finding what you hoped? I can
relate, I remember getting a textbook on the brain hoping to find
insight into consciousness and being sorely disappointed. When looking
into mind-related research I've found "cognitive" to be a much more
productive keyword than "neuro-". For your questions specifically you
want "cognitive neuroscience", not "neurology".

But I don't know how that comports with your quote from Cobb, if you
agree with it at least, because I'd have said the very *reason*
"neurology" isn't the field with satisfying insights on consciousness is
*because* it's focused on much lower-level processes, full of zebrafish
and discrete, doable investigation into "scripts" and such.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
I agree, and last I checked I'd gotten the impression that they were,
and doing so more seriously than the other way around. But I can't say
I've done a thorough survey either and I could be influenced by the fact
I follow Alison Gopnik so I could be improperly generalizing from her
work and that of people in her circles.
Martin Harran
2024-04-25 07:55:47 UTC
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Post by Arkalen
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Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
Post by Arkalen
Science isn't about mindlessly looking at things,
science is about building models, theories - and validating them by
figuring out if they have any consequence on what anything might look
and looking there. The theory is more fundamental than the observations
and it can get away with even the most glancing relationship to the
"visible". The issue with dualism isn't that it's non-visible, it's that
it has no explanatory power and the main reason it has no explanatory
power is that it behaves like a false idea in response to evidence (for
example act like it's irrelevant when brain activity turns out to
totally correlate with every distinct aspect of the mind one can find).
In other words there is "being non-visible" and then there's "actively
shunning visibility", and dualism does the latter. This is a tradeoff of
risk of disconfirmation for lack of content, and it's lack of content
that's the real problem for science.
Multiverse ideas that science entertains (which is obviously not all of
them) are straightforward deductions from models that have been
otherwise validated by their interactions with visible things,
That doesn't mean that their answers are reliable. The Ptolemaic model
was used for rather a long time, giving what mostly were correct
answers but turned out to be utterly wrong in its foundation.
Post by Arkalen
and the
scientists entertaining them would love nothing more than to work out
consequences of these models that would result in a
yet-unobserved-but-visible difference compared to other models. Because
until they do, being "entertained" by science is the best those ideas
can hope for.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
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Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
referring to some bar for "understanding" or "answer" that hasn't been
met and not saying there's been no change at all, or maybe he's
referring to some specific over-optimistic predictions made by that 1953
magazine. Or maybe he's indeed saying something I disagree with, idk.
Bearing in mind that Cobb is an ardent materialist (see the quote
about Chalmers and Nigel above), I think you would find the book an
interesting read.
Post by Arkalen
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The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
I read "The man who mistook his wife for a hat" and "Musicophilia"; the
former is as fun as the title suggests but I'm guessing your reading
list is quite full already :)
I've bumped 'The Evolution of Agency' up my list and I'm currently
just over a third of the way through it; as you said it's a fairly
short and easy read. I'm finding it an interesting read but so far I
can't see how it in any way supports determinism - it seems the very
opposite - but I'm always cautious about judging a book until I read
it fully so I'll discuss that when I'm finished with it.
Post by Arkalen
Like I said, I was mentioning him as an
example of work into how our mind can be broken down into different
processes that are sometimes surprisingly separable (like speaking and
understanding) or surprisingly linked (like emotion and decision-making).
Post by Martin Harran
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The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
It's true the big data is not knowledge, and it's also definitely true
that advances in scanning technology have been a mixed bag, with fMRI in
particular resulting in a lot of junk science. It doesn't mean it's all
junk however or that advances haven't been made. Anil Seth's book in
particular is definitely discussing advances in our understanding, not
raw data or junk fMRI entrail-reading (if he was careful enough at
least, which he comes across as being).
Cobb certainly does not dismiss the wealth of data as junk, he thinks
the problem is that no *framework* has been found within which sense
can be made of the data. He also thinks we are trying too hard to look
at the big picture, he is particularly disparaging about the Human
Brain Project wich ran for 10 years with £1 billion in funding from
the EU and produced nothing of value. His own solution is to start
"My own preference for how best to proceed in understanding the brain
would be to pour resources into discrete, doable projects able to
provide insight that can subsequently be integrated into a more global
approach. Crick's approach to studying consciousness applies to the
brain as a whole, it seems to me. As some parts of theoretical physics
demonstrate, high-flying ideas that are not rooted in experimental
reality can generate vast amounts of excitement and occupy whole
academic careers, without necessarily advancing understanding. By
developing analytical techniques and theoretical frameworks to
understand what a fly thinks, we will lay the ground for understanding
more complex brains; trying to understand simple animal brains will
keep us busy for the rest of the century, at least. If you feel that
any study of the brain must involve a vertebrate to be truly
interesting, the brain of the tiny zebrafish larva consists of only
100,000 neurons, and easily falls into the small-brain category."
Again I'm not sure what he means by a lack of "framework" or "discrete,
doable projects". There are plenty of people investigating the brain and
consciousness from all kinds of angles and most of them are "concrete,
doable projects". I think Anil Seth's "Being You" describes such
frameworks and projects for example. He's either referring to something
specific that I'm not getting from context, or I just disagree with him.
Post by Martin Harran
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Post by Arkalen
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
I haven't read it either but I probably should, "system 1/system 2" puts
names to ideas I'd cobbled together myself from various sources but
didn't know had a name. I've been starting to use those terms but should
probably check what he actually uses them to say before I go too far
with that.
I'd definitely recommend Anil Seth's "Being You" for you though. He also
has talks on youtube, I could find one to link if you like.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
Neural networks are decades old, they're not the kind of contribution
from human & animal cognition I was thinking of. In fact to my
understanding people working in AI aren't really keeping up to date with
research into neurons themselves either, figuring that the kind of
neuron behavior they already implement is sufficient to the processing
they're trying to do and/or that adding complexity at that level will
harm rather than help. I don't have an opinion as to whether they're
right or wrong on that, like I said it's not the contribution I had in
mind. But I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the contributions of
neural science currently used in computer neural networks were pretty
much all contributed in the previous millennium.
Post by Martin Harran
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
You definitely want to read Alison Gopnik then, her work is very much
informed by AI research and it is clearly a field she keeps up to date
with and collaborates with researchers from.
I will get around to reading some of her stuff but my reading list is
lengthening by the day as inevitably happens when I get involved in
this type of discussion <smile>. I note she is a
psychologist/philosopher, not a neurologist. I don't have an issue
with that, as I've said previously, I think we will only ever get to
understand the brain and consciousness by drawing from a wide range of
areas. I only mention it because I think there is still overwhelming
reliance on neurology to provide the answers.
"Is there" really overwhelming reliance on neurology to provide the
answers or is it you who expect neurology to provide them and are
therefore only looking there and not finding what you hoped? I can
relate, I remember getting a textbook on the brain hoping to find
insight into consciousness and being sorely disappointed. When looking
into mind-related research I've found "cognitive" to be a much more
productive keyword than "neuro-". For your questions specifically you
want "cognitive neuroscience", not "neurology".
But I don't know how that comports with your quote from Cobb, if you
agree with it at least, because I'd have said the very *reason*
"neurology" isn't the field with satisfying insights on consciousness is
*because* it's focused on much lower-level processes, full of zebrafish
and discrete, doable investigation into "scripts" and such.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
I agree, and last I checked I'd gotten the impression that they were,
and doing so more seriously than the other way around. But I can't say
I've done a thorough survey either and I could be influenced by the fact
I follow Alison Gopnik so I could be improperly generalizing from her
work and that of people in her circles.
Arkalen
2024-04-26 11:46:18 UTC
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Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).

"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.


So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
I read your applying "non-visible" to those models as saying "both of
those are models positing the existence of 'real things' that haven't
been observed, and maybe cannot be observed at all". And like I said
science doesn't exclude such models in principle because "observation"
is a constantly moving target. If you have a model positing some real,
currently-unobservable thing X, and working out the logical consequences
of this model you find that it says something about some part of the
word we *could* observe that requires the existence of X, and based on
that you formulate the prediction "if X is true then we should observe
Y"... Then it's not only that would we be able to find X is true even
though X cannot be observed - the observation of Y would *count as an
observation of X*! Meaning X would have been become observable. The
history of modern science is full of such transitions from "hypothetical
unobservable entity" to "come up with clever experimental validation of
the entity's existence anyway" to "the clever experimental setup is now
a tool for observing the entity".


I don't know if that clarifies at all the more detailed explanation I
had below of the differences between dualism and multiverse theory that
account for the different ways they're treated in science?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Science isn't about mindlessly looking at things,
science is about building models, theories - and validating them by
figuring out if they have any consequence on what anything might look
and looking there. The theory is more fundamental than the observations
and it can get away with even the most glancing relationship to the
"visible". The issue with dualism isn't that it's non-visible, it's that
it has no explanatory power and the main reason it has no explanatory
power is that it behaves like a false idea in response to evidence (for
example act like it's irrelevant when brain activity turns out to
totally correlate with every distinct aspect of the mind one can find).
In other words there is "being non-visible" and then there's "actively
shunning visibility", and dualism does the latter. This is a tradeoff of
risk of disconfirmation for lack of content, and it's lack of content
that's the real problem for science.
Multiverse ideas that science entertains (which is obviously not all of
them) are straightforward deductions from models that have been
otherwise validated by their interactions with visible things,
That doesn't mean that their answers are reliable. The Ptolemaic model
was used for rather a long time, giving what mostly were correct
answers but turned out to be utterly wrong in its foundation.
Of course "satisfies predictions" isn't the only criterion by which
science judges models; I mentioned it here because I was illustrating a
relationship between unobservable and observable aspects of models.
Science uses many criteria to evaluate models. In this case the models
that I was talking about as being the baseline that multiverse ideas
extrapolate from (those science entertains at least) either pass all the
criteria easily because they're consensus science (like quantum
mechanics, for quantum multiverse hypotheses), or they fit the criteria
closely enough to merit debate (like all the candidate extensions of the
Big Bang theory, for most of the other multiverse hypotheses).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
and the
scientists entertaining them would love nothing more than to work out
consequences of these models that would result in a
yet-unobserved-but-visible difference compared to other models. Because
until they do, being "entertained" by science is the best those ideas
can hope for.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
referring to some bar for "understanding" or "answer" that hasn't been
met and not saying there's been no change at all, or maybe he's
referring to some specific over-optimistic predictions made by that 1953
magazine. Or maybe he's indeed saying something I disagree with, idk.
Bearing in mind that Cobb is an ardent materialist (see the quote
about Chalmers and Nigel above), I think you would find the book an
interesting read.
Yes, I'll see if I can get ahold of it.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
I read "The man who mistook his wife for a hat" and "Musicophilia"; the
former is as fun as the title suggests but I'm guessing your reading
list is quite full already :)
I've bumped 'The Evolution of Agency' up my list and I'm currently
just over a third of the way through it; as you said it's a fairly
short and easy read. I'm finding it an interesting read but so far I
can't see how it in any way supports determinism - it seems the very
opposite - but I'm always cautious about judging a book until I read
it fully so I'll discuss that when I'm finished with it.
I'm glad you find it interesting! I'm not sure what you mean about it
not supporting determinism; I wasn't thinking about determinism or
non-determinism at all when I brought it up. ISTM in this bit of the
conversation we were talking about dualism and where the science is at
on understanding our minds. (and it was tangential to even this context,
as I pointed out when I recommended it :))


snip
Martin Harran
2024-04-27 08:09:54 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).
Sorry, you're losing me a bit here. Perhaps it is me still
misunderstanding exactly what you mean by 'visible'. Thing don't have
to be visible for us to study them and draw conclusions; we can study
the effects or symptoms that they have and try to work out what could
be causing those effects or symptoms. Gravity is an example - gravity
itself is not visible and we don't even know yet exactly what it is,
but we have figured out a heck of a lot about it by studying the
effects and symptoms. We need,however, some way to assess those
effects and symptoms and that is where 'quantifiable' and 'testable'
come in.
Post by Arkalen
"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.
So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.

I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years." I
don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."


'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Post by Arkalen
I read your applying "non-visible" to those models as saying "both of
those are models positing the existence of 'real things' that haven't
been observed, and maybe cannot be observed at all". And like I said
science doesn't exclude such models in principle because "observation"
is a constantly moving target. If you have a model positing some real,
currently-unobservable thing X, and working out the logical consequences
of this model you find that it says something about some part of the
word we *could* observe that requires the existence of X, and based on
that you formulate the prediction "if X is true then we should observe
Y"... Then it's not only that would we be able to find X is true even
though X cannot be observed - the observation of Y would *count as an
observation of X*! Meaning X would have been become observable. The
history of modern science is full of such transitions from "hypothetical
unobservable entity" to "come up with clever experimental validation of
the entity's existence anyway" to "the clever experimental setup is now
a tool for observing the entity".
I don't know if that clarifies at all the more detailed explanation I
had below of the differences between dualism and multiverse theory that
account for the different ways they're treated in science?
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Science isn't about mindlessly looking at things,
science is about building models, theories - and validating them by
figuring out if they have any consequence on what anything might look
and looking there. The theory is more fundamental than the observations
and it can get away with even the most glancing relationship to the
"visible". The issue with dualism isn't that it's non-visible, it's that
it has no explanatory power and the main reason it has no explanatory
power is that it behaves like a false idea in response to evidence (for
example act like it's irrelevant when brain activity turns out to
totally correlate with every distinct aspect of the mind one can find).
In other words there is "being non-visible" and then there's "actively
shunning visibility", and dualism does the latter. This is a tradeoff of
risk of disconfirmation for lack of content, and it's lack of content
that's the real problem for science.
Multiverse ideas that science entertains (which is obviously not all of
them) are straightforward deductions from models that have been
otherwise validated by their interactions with visible things,
That doesn't mean that their answers are reliable. The Ptolemaic model
was used for rather a long time, giving what mostly were correct
answers but turned out to be utterly wrong in its foundation.
Of course "satisfies predictions" isn't the only criterion by which
science judges models; I mentioned it here because I was illustrating a
relationship between unobservable and observable aspects of models.
Science uses many criteria to evaluate models. In this case the models
that I was talking about as being the baseline that multiverse ideas
extrapolate from (those science entertains at least) either pass all the
criteria easily because they're consensus science (like quantum
mechanics, for quantum multiverse hypotheses), or they fit the criteria
closely enough to merit debate (like all the candidate extensions of the
Big Bang theory, for most of the other multiverse hypotheses).
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
and the
scientists entertaining them would love nothing more than to work out
consequences of these models that would result in a
yet-unobserved-but-visible difference compared to other models. Because
until they do, being "entertained" by science is the best those ideas
can hope for.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
referring to some bar for "understanding" or "answer" that hasn't been
met and not saying there's been no change at all, or maybe he's
referring to some specific over-optimistic predictions made by that 1953
magazine. Or maybe he's indeed saying something I disagree with, idk.
Bearing in mind that Cobb is an ardent materialist (see the quote
about Chalmers and Nigel above), I think you would find the book an
interesting read.
Yes, I'll see if I can get ahold of it.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
I read "The man who mistook his wife for a hat" and "Musicophilia"; the
former is as fun as the title suggests but I'm guessing your reading
list is quite full already :)
I've bumped 'The Evolution of Agency' up my list and I'm currently
just over a third of the way through it; as you said it's a fairly
short and easy read. I'm finding it an interesting read but so far I
can't see how it in any way supports determinism - it seems the very
opposite - but I'm always cautious about judging a book until I read
it fully so I'll discuss that when I'm finished with it.
I'm glad you find it interesting! I'm not sure what you mean about it
not supporting determinism; I wasn't thinking about determinism or
non-determinism at all when I brought it up. ISTM in this bit of the
conversation we were talking about dualism and where the science is at
on understanding our minds. (and it was tangential to even this context,
as I pointed out when I recommended it :))
snip
Arkalen
2024-04-27 13:12:31 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).
Sorry, you're losing me a bit here. Perhaps it is me still
misunderstanding exactly what you mean by 'visible'. Thing don't have
to be visible for us to study them and draw conclusions; we can study
the effects or symptoms that they have and try to work out what could
be causing those effects or symptoms. Gravity is an example - gravity
itself is not visible and we don't even know yet exactly what it is,
but we have figured out a heck of a lot about it by studying the
effects and symptoms. We need,however, some way to assess those
effects and symptoms and that is where 'quantifiable' and 'testable'
come in.
But "visible" is upstream of either of those. The "effects and symptoms"
of gravity are detectable - at the extreme end they're directly
perceptible by our senses insofar as any measuring tool we have
ultimately outputs something we can directly perceive. That's what
allows us to infer that our model saying gravity has
otherwise-unobservable features is correct.

"Quantifiable" and "testable" is a description of what science can *do*
with those effects and symptoms, and that's something that evolves over
time. What the words mean can also evolve over time - for example "is
this aspect of some phenomenon present/absent" is a kind of
quantification; it's not usually thought of as such because
"quantification" suggests more numbers than 1 and 0 but 1 and 0 are
indeed numbers and that's often where the studying starts.

I'm a bit confused because you said earlier that "you accept science can
only study visible behavior" but now it seems you categorize gravity as
non-visible while agreeing it's something science can and does study.
This was kind of my point. Our understanding of gravity is mostly a
*model* - an abstract idea of a thing that we can't directly observe but
we still believe matches something real. The difference between science
and "just making things up" is that science has very rigorous standards
for the models and conditions belief in them on them having some
suitable impact on our perceptions. By "suitable" I mean that this
impact can be tiny or indirect, what actually matters is the comparative
probability of this impact being observed if reality matches the model
vs if it doesn't.

In terms of why I originally brought this up, I was responding to your
statement that "science cannot explain consciousness of which
decision-making is a subset". I probably misread the sentence as saying
science cannot explain those things *in principle* when you actually
just meant that science can't explain them *right now*. Even so I'm
surprised at the idea that science currently cannot explain
decision-making - but then I'm not sure what level of explanation you
were thinking of with that sentence.

But all that to say "visible" in this context referred to the fact that
if we think of consciousness as causing our visible behavior, then
science absolutely could explain it in principle. And I probably
misunderstood you when I thought this was something you might disagree with.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.
So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
Science doesn't reject dualism in principle, it rejects it because no
dualism hypothesis meets the standards of a scientific hypothesis. "I
think we should be able to figure out ways of studying the effects and
symptoms that would come from dualism" is exactly correct! Can you give
examples of such effects or symptoms?

Science rejects ideas for *lack of content* (or internally contradictory
content, or content that clearly doesn't correspond to reality); being
unquantified and untestable are often the signature symptom for lack of
content but it's the lack of content that's the reason they get rejected.

It's not a trivial thing at all, plenty of perfectly cromulent-looking
scientific ideas eventually gathered controversy and even rejections
because closer examination eventually revealed that they didn't *say*
anything - often a dichotomy of "what it does say is wrong, and if
that's set aside then it doesn't say anything at all". I remember an
essay about the island rule in ecology to this effect but I couldn't
find it. Some blogs referring to the Intermediate Disturbance Hypothesis
as a "zombie idea" seem to be similar though, as here:
https://www.oikosjournal.org/blog/zombie-ideas-ecology

String theory is another example - the main reason scientists are very
cool on string theory isn't that it makes claims that cannot be tested
in practice, it's that there are too many different things it can be
made to say. Which raises the possibility that it doesn't say anything
at all and is just a fun mathematical formalism with no specific
relationship to the fundamental particles it claims to describe. The
relevant thing to note here is that *scientists disagree on whether this
is the case*. It can be legitimately hard to tell whether a hypothesis
"says anything"! "This idea seems to say something" isn't enough to tell
whether it does, and whether what it says isn't the exact same thing as
an different idea that says it more clearly.

That is the standard by which science judges dualism and it hasn't met
it for a very long time now.
Post by Martin Harran
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years." I
don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Yeah. I bet Sir John Maddox knew that very well. I mean, look - he
invoked *the Pope's condemnation of Galileo*... on the side of the
Pope!! You don't say that kind of thing because you mistakenly erred
from the ideals of your field, or because you're failing to hold them
up. You say that when you're trying to express whatever point it is you
have in the most provocative way possible.

If you read the actual review you'll see he has concrete objections to
Sheldrake's claims as hypotheses - in fact he says very little that
suggests he objects to them as conclusions. One can presume he does
object to the conclusions and his objections to the hypotheses as
hypotheses follow from that, but the actual arguments are about their
merits as hypotheses. When scientists dismiss something as "magic"
that's usually what they mean: a claim that doesn't meet the standards
of a scientific hypothesis, typically by not having enough content for
any conclusions to be reliably drawn from the premise.


snip
Mark Isaak
2024-04-27 23:32:48 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
snip
Post by Martin Harran
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Arkalen
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).
Sorry, you're losing me a bit here. Perhaps it is me still
misunderstanding exactly what you mean by 'visible'. Thing don't have
to be visible for us to study them and draw conclusions; we can study
the effects or symptoms that they have and try to work out what could
be causing those effects or symptoms. Gravity is an example - gravity
itself is not visible and we don't even know yet exactly what it is,
but we have figured out a heck of a lot about it by studying the
effects and symptoms. We need,however, some way to assess those
effects and symptoms and that is where 'quantifiable' and 'testable'
come in.
Post by Arkalen
"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.
So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
Post by Martin Harran
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Post by Martin Harran
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic? If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
Post by Martin Harran
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Martin Harran
2024-04-28 15:40:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
[big snip for focus]
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
an example or two.
Post by Mark Isaak
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
Post by Martin Harran
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
about.

The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
dispel supernatural ideas.
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.

An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
science would be useful.
Post by Mark Isaak
If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
Post by Martin Harran
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
scientists who shared that understanding.
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-29 02:16:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
[big snip for focus]
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
an example or two.
Post by Mark Isaak
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
Post by Martin Harran
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
about.
The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
dispel supernatural ideas.
So I guess you’ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
Chopra?

The most annoying thing about Sheldrake is how he caused so many people to
associate his musing on formative causation and morpic fields with the far
more serious concept of morphogenetic fields that developmental biologists
had explored over the years. Silly stuff put forward by Sheldrake is never
considered for good reason:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9579920/

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/immunology-and-microbiology/morphogen

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3413735/

More serious work has been done by people like Brian Goodwin, Lewis Wolpert
and numerous others. All Sheldrake has done is sow confusion about the
morphogenetic field concept where most laypeople and many biologists
outside that field think he’s responsible for the concept.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
science would be useful.
An explanation of why you think Sheldrake’s work was of scientific
importance and not magic would be useful instead. I’m invoking Hitchens’
razor here. Otherwise this turns into a pointless game of whack-a-mole. The
onus is on you alone.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
Post by Martin Harran
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
scientists who shared that understanding.
Yeah Sheldrake has done groundbreaking work on psychic pets.

By the way you have left my assertions that Gould’s arguments on drunkard
walks, bacterial predominance, and contingency put a monkey wrench in
Teilhard’s Christward pointing orthogenesis completely unaddressed.
Martin Harran
2024-04-29 06:12:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
<***@allspamis.invalid> wrote:

[...]
So I guess you’ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
Chopra?
What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?

Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
rather than what they did say?


[...]
erik simpson
2024-04-29 14:42:01 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*
[...]
Post by *Hemidactylus*
So I guess you’ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak
Chopra?
What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
rather than what they did say?
[...]
The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
jillery
2024-04-15 05:01:42 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Fri, 12 Apr 2024 12:56:07 +0100, Martin Harran
Post by Martin Harran
Secondly, even if some unidentified energy supply is necessary, I
can't understand why you see that as a problem; 50 years ago we knew
nothing about the existence of dark energy, but now we know a lot
about it. Why do you rule out other forces or supplies of energy that
we don't know anything about?
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_energy>

All we know about dark energy is there exists an observed behavior of
the cosmos that's consistent with a form of negative pressure
associated with spacetime itself. Its cause remains unknown.

As to your larger point, to suggest that our ignorance of dark matter,
or of any aspect of cutting edge science, justifies a presumption that
the mind has access to sources of energy beyond which are already
identified, is logically absurd.

--
To know less than we don't know is the nature of most knowledge
Mark Isaak
2024-04-19 02:00:27 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On 4/10/24 2:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
[big snip]
Post by Martin Harran
What conditions affecting my decision-making have changed from when I
went to bed last night until I woke this morning?
How tired you are, for one.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Burkhard
2024-04-08 13:26:46 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"

sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.

The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.

The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-08 17:32:02 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.
The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Is rumination (overthinking) the curse of System 2 deliberation? Maybe it
cannot be helped so either it’s not free will or instead free will as a
catastrophizing train wreck?

Paralysis by analysis is also detrimental, but so is System 1 impulsiveness
or shooting from the hip in some instances.

What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?
LDagget
2024-04-08 18:21:46 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by *Hemidactylus*
What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?
speed chess
Arkalen
2024-04-09 04:39:26 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by *Hemidactylus*
Post by Burkhard
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.
The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Is rumination (overthinking) the curse of System 2 deliberation? Maybe it
cannot be helped so either it’s not free will or instead free will as a
catastrophizing train wreck?
Paralysis by analysis is also detrimental, but so is System 1 impulsiveness
or shooting from the hip in some instances.
What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that
the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it
become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?
I don't know the answer but that's my guess too. I bet the way this
works is that System 2 is able to feed data into System 1 that it can
learn from the same way it learns from experience. Except with a huge
discount because System 1 is mostly a black box from a "changing how it
works" perspective, and it probably wouldn't be adaptive to do too much
of that anyway (System 2 is good but not *that* good).

That actually reminds me of Anil Seth's ideas on free will in "Being
You" which probably works out to exactly this. Basically his take is
that "free will" isn't about the past but about the future. It's asking
"could I have done differently" not from a determinism perspective but
to answer "could/should I do differently next time & how". If we assume
decisions are mostly System 1, for this to work requires System 2 to be
able to influence System 1's intuitive backgrounding.
Martin Harran
2024-04-09 08:57:40 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Burkhard
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.
The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free.
No, you've completely misunderstood what I said - see my latest reply
to Don where I expanded on my thinking about Cost vs Benefits.
Post by Burkhard
But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman.
That's a book I've never got around to reading but I really should do
so.
Post by Burkhard
He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
Post by DB Cates
--
--
Mark Isaak
2024-04-19 01:53:08 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
The pondering, presumably, is part of what determines the
predetermination. Your question strikes me as analogous to "Why does
water flow in rivers if it is predetermined to end up in the ocean?"
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
I highly recommend Kahneman's book _Thinking Fast and Slow_. Our brains
have two thinking methods -- a fast one for when quick decisions are
called for, and a slower one which lets us do algebra and other such
activities. The fast one works well enough, but has multiple shortcuts
which lead to various reasoning fallacies.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
Martin Harran
2024-04-22 09:03:45 UTC
Reply
Permalink
On Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:53:08 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
The pondering, presumably, is part of what determines the
predetermination. Your question strikes me as analogous to "Why does
water flow in rivers if it is predetermined to end up in the ocean?"
That is a rather peculiar analogy. We know exactly why the water flows
and in this case it is an external force - gravity. It is the
involvement of an external force that is one of the main objections to
dualism!
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
I highly recommend Kahneman's book _Thinking Fast and Slow_. Our brains
have two thinking methods -- a fast one for when quick decisions are
called for, and a slower one which lets us do algebra and other such
activities. The fast one works well enough, but has multiple shortcuts
which lead to various reasoning fallacies.
On my list, which, as I've just told Arkalen, is increasing all the
time!

On the subject of books, you mentioned recently that you enjoyed Annie
Murphy Paul's book 'The Extended Mind: The Power of Thinking Outside
the Brain.' I read this a while back (it was me who mentioned it here
originally) and I'd be interested to hear your views on it,
particularly whether it has affected your thinking on the reliance on
neurology which you seemed to favour in previous discussions.
Mark Isaak
2024-04-24 16:35:38 UTC
Reply
Permalink
Post by Martin Harran
On Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:53:08 -0700, Mark Isaak
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
Post by DB Cates
Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
Post by Martin Harran
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
The pondering, presumably, is part of what determines the
predetermination. Your question strikes me as analogous to "Why does
water flow in rivers if it is predetermined to end up in the ocean?"
That is a rather peculiar analogy. We know exactly why the water flows
and in this case it is an external force - gravity. It is the
involvement of an external force that is one of the main objections to
dualism!
If predetermination is in play (as your question above hypothesizes),
then it seems to me that external forces are all you've got, even if you
don't recognize them all.
Post by Martin Harran
Post by Mark Isaak
Post by Martin Harran
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
I highly recommend Kahneman's book _Thinking Fast and Slow_. Our brains
have two thinking methods -- a fast one for when quick decisions are
called for, and a slower one which lets us do algebra and other such
activities. The fast one works well enough, but has multiple shortcuts
which lead to various reasoning fallacies.
On my list, which, as I've just told Arkalen, is increasing all the
time!
Maybe I can help a bit by mentioning one book you may skip: _The
Evolution of Consciousness_ by Robert Ornstein. It has some good
information on how the mind works (Ornstein describes it as a collection
of simpletons -- simple modules for certain tasks), but it does not
deliver on the promise implied by the title. It is entertaining
nontheless. If you do read it, I suggest skipping the first part (with
explains evolution; you know that already) and the last part (musings
about implications, with no empirical input).
Post by Martin Harran
On the subject of books, you mentioned recently that you enjoyed Annie
Murphy Paul's book 'The Extended Mind: The Power of Thinking Outside
the Brain.' I read this a while back (it was me who mentioned it here
originally) and I'd be interested to hear your views on it,
particularly whether it has affected your thinking on the reliance on
neurology which you seemed to favour in previous discussions.
I'll quote the review I wrote for Goodreads, while it was still fresh in
my memory:
A good exploration of how things outside our heads affect our thinking
-- gut feelings, our own movements and gestures, our environments,
experts, peers, and groups. Paul makes good use of anecdotes to
illustrate the points. For the most part, what she describes appears to
be well-founded on research (copious references are provided), but
sometimes she extends into what *may* be the case, and those parts are
not well marked. I also wonder if some of the strategies she proposes
have negative unintended consequences. For example, she advocates
arguing points (each person then need concentrate on only one side), but
does not mention research in other contexts showing that arguing can
make views more firmly entrenched, even if they're wrong.

As for its influence, I think it reinforced my understanding that lots
of things affect thinking. It occurs to me that I don't remember Paul
mentioning hormones and other chemicals; if so, that would be a serious
oversight given her book's subject. I suppose my thinking may be
summarized as: The brain, and the neurological system in general, is not
separable from the rest of the body.

One influence the book did have is that I now often engage in light
exercise while I read.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
*Hemidactylus*
2024-04-24 20:29:56 UTC
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Mark Isaak <***@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[snip]
Post by Mark Isaak
Maybe I can help a bit by mentioning one book you may skip: _The
Evolution of Consciousness_ by Robert Ornstein. It has some good
information on how the mind works (Ornstein describes it as a collection
of simpletons -- simple modules for certain tasks), but it does not
deliver on the promise implied by the title. It is entertaining
nontheless. If you do read it, I suggest skipping the first part (with
explains evolution; you know that already) and the last part (musings
about implications, with no empirical input).
I had read the book quite a while back. The part that struck me was how
Ornstein set up a personal experience of his where the mayor of San
Francisco introduced him to a certain left wing social justice clergyman
who would go on to become quite infamous for the distribution of a popular
flavored powder drink. Ornstein floored me with the reveal. I did not see
it coming in the way he set the stage.
Mark Isaak
2024-04-19 01:10:59 UTC
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Post by Martin Harran
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I've been out of town, so I'm late to this discussion, and I haven't
read everyone else's contributions yet.

Many decisions (like buying a car) are too complicated to reason
through, at least not entirely. In such cases, the best outcomes, I have
read somewhere, come from loading your brain with all the relevant data,
letting it brew (so to speak) and make connections subconsciously, and
then, after a day or so, going with your feelings. (If I recall right,
the relevant experiment used people buying furniture, not cars.)

Making a decision is an emotional process. Reason can influence it, but
without emotion, you'll just sit there doing nothing. (This is based on
a brain-damage patient whose emotional centers were damaged. He could
reason well what outcomes would come, but he didn't make decisions.)
Emotions can be swayed by any number of things, such as how tired or
hungry you are, so it shouldn't be surprising that decisions can change.

Libet's experiments of course would not apply to anything that took a
lot of time and effort.
--
Mark Isaak
"Wisdom begins when you discover the difference between 'That
doesn't make sense' and 'I don't understand.'" - Mary Doria Russell
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